University of the District of Columbia School of Law

Digital Commons @ UDC Law
Journal Articles

Publications

2018

The New Gospel of Wealth: On Social Impact Bonds and the
Privatization of Public Good
Etienne C. Toussaint

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.udc.edu/fac_journal_articles
Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Do Not Delete

9/21/2018 3:49 PM

ARTICLE
THE NEW GOSPEL OF WEALTH:
ON SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS AND THE
PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC GOOD
Etienne C. Toussaint*
ABSTRACT
Since Andrew Carnegie penned his famous Gospel of Wealth
in 1889, corporate philanthropists have championed considerable
public good around the world, investing in a wide range of social
programs addressing a diversity of public issues, from poverty to
healthcare to criminal justice. Nevertheless, the problem of “the
Rich and the Poor,” as termed by Andrew Carnegie in his famous
essay, remains unsolved. Socially conscious investors have
recently called for America to reimagine a new “gospel of wealth”,
one that not only grapples with the what of social injustice, but
also explores the how and the why of systemic social and economic
inequality. An emerging social finance tool, the social impact bond
(“SIB”), has been praised as a promising platform that can help
solve many of our social challenges by targeting impact
investments toward traditionally underfunded social welfare
programs.
This Article sets forth a critical examination of the new SIB
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model, highlighting some of the opportunities for the social finance
tool to promote social impact, while also revealing several of its
challenges that may hinder its broader adoption in communities
across America. In the process, this Article exposes key flaws
inherent in the design of the SIB model, including its neoliberal
emphasis on market-based economic development strategies and
its disregard for the primary role of government in the protection
and advancement of the public good. It concludes by calling for a
more progressive economic development framework to guide the
implementation of the SIB model, one that can help development
practitioners, philanthropists, and impact investors wrestle with
the deficiencies of our global capitalist economic system and
overcome the entrenched systemic barriers to economic justice in
America.
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“I never asked for nothin I don’t demand of myself / Honesty,
loyalty, friends and then wealth.” – Jay-Z, Justify My Thug1
“Our self-awareness—our humility—shouldn’t be limited to
examining the problems. It should include the structures of
solutions, like giving itself . . . It is, after all, an offspring of the free
market; it is enabled by returns on capital.” – Darren Walker2
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1889, Andrew Carnegie, the Scottish-born industrialist and
titan of America’s Gilded Age,3 published The Gospel of Wealth,
articulating a moral philosophy that has become a touchstone of
America’s rich philanthropic tradition.4 Carnegie’s collection of
essays explained his belief in the enduring value of a Darwinian
capitalist economic system, notwithstanding that system’s
production of great inequality, as well as his perspective on “the
duty of the man of Wealth.”5 According to Carnegie, the ideals of
individualism and human drive should be honored by society,
principally because the accumulation of capital by the few is
essential for “the progress of the race” and “the refinement of
civilization,” while also necessary to help our great nation avoid
the “universal squalor” that would attend more equitable
distributions of income.6 Recognizing the inherent tensions in our
capitalist economic system, creating a world of “Rich and Poor,”
Carnegie called for the wealthy to live “unostentatious” lives, and
become “trustees” for the poor, by giving away the majority of their
wealth after providing “moderately for the legitimate wants” of
those dependent upon them.7
Andrew Carnegie did in fact give away almost 90% of his
wealth during his lifetime, donating over $350 million (nearly $4.8
billion in 2017 dollars) toward charitable causes and establishing
thousands of libraries around the world, including some famous

1. JAY-Z, Justify My Thug, on THE BLACK ALBUM (Roc-A-Fella Records 2003).
2. Darren Walker, Why Giving Back Isn’t Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2015, at A39.
3. See Andrew Carnegie Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM (Nov. 22, 2016),
http://www.biography.com/people/andrew-carnegie-9238756 [https://perma.cc/H8YXMQDG] [hereinafter Andrew Carnegie Biography].
4. See generally ANDREW CARNEGIE, “THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH” ESSAYS AND OTHER
WRITINGS viii–ix (David Nasaw ed., 2006).
5. See generally id. at 2–3, 10.
6. See id. at 1, 8.
7. See id. at 10−12.
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educational and cultural institutions that are well known today.8
Contemporary philanthropists like Warren Buffet, Bill Gates, and
more recently Jeff Bezos, have followed in Andrew Carnegie’s
footsteps. Indeed, in 2010, Bill and Melinda Gates and Warren
Buffet founded the Giving Pledge, calling on the world’s wealthiest
individuals to give away the majority of their wealth.9
Additionally, Jeff Bezos recently pledged to donate $33 million
toward an educational scholarship program for immigrants
brought to the U.S. illegally as children.10
Nevertheless, while corporate philanthropy has dispensed a
tremendous amount of good around the world, targeting a wide
range of social issues from poverty to healthcare to criminal
justice, the problem of “the Rich and the Poor” has not been solved,
as Andrew Carnegie predicted it would be.11 Instead, our
development efforts have fallen short. Despite navigating through
the horrors of Jim Crow and state-sponsored racial segregation,12
we still wrestle with racial injustice in the form of mass
incarceration and racially biased over-policing of minority
communities.13 Despite donating millions toward education,
8. Andrew Carnegie built Carnegie Hall and founded the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, and
Carnegie Mellon University, among other educational and cultural institutions. Chloe
Sorvino, The Gilded Age Family That Gave It All Away: The Carnegies, FORBES (July 8,
2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chloesorvino/2014/07/08/whats-become-of-them-thecarnegie-family/#2b230f37b550 [https://perma.cc/BFP4-C8H9]; see Andrew Carnegie
Biography, supra note 3; Evan Andrews, Andrew Carnegie’s Surprise Legacy, HISTORY
(Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.history.com/news/andrew-carnegies-surprising-legacy
[https://perma.cc/T8TR-6BJB].
9. Thus far, at least 183 individuals and families have signed onto the Giving
Pledge, including Tesla’s Elon Musk and Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg. History of the
Pledge, GIVING PLEDGE, https://givingpledge.org/About.aspx [https://perma.cc/S646-CQY9]
(last visited July 2, 2018); id. at Pledge Signatories.
10. Michael Stratford and Steven Overly, Amazon’s Bezos to give $33M for 1,000
Dreamer scholarships, POLITICO (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/1
2/bezos-dreamers-scholarships-337924 [https://perma.cc/R5ZU-8XJD].
11. See CARNEGIE, supra note 4, at 12 (“Thus is the problem of Rich and Poor to be
solved. The laws of accumulation will be left free; the laws of distribution free.
Individualism will continue, but the millionaire will be but a trustee of the poor; intrusted
for a season with a great part of the increased wealth of the community, but administering
it for the community far better than it could or would have done for itself.”).
12. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY
OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 17, 19, 101 (2018) (discussing, among
other topics, the effect of public housing on de jure segregation, racially motivated zoning
laws, and racially motivated taxation policies).
13. See Etienne C. Toussaint, Incarceration to Incorporation: Economic
Empowerment for Returning Citizens Through Social Impact Bonds, 25 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUN. DEV. L. 61, 62 n.3 (2016) (discussing the history of the Black Lives
Matter movement, which “seek[s] to affirm the lives of Black men and women who, on a
daily basis, experience the negative impacts of institutionalized white supremacy and
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millions of children in marginalized communities are still being
left behind.14 Despite making significant investments toward the
global health crisis, adequate healthcare remains an uncertainty
for many American families.15 Despite launching a War on Poverty
and a Poor People’s Campaign, unemployment remains high, and
the wealth gap is increasing at an alarming rate.16 At some point,
we must ask ourselves whether Andrew Carnegie’s Gospel of
Wealth has failed to save us from the sins of capitalism and instead
has strengthened our lust for using market-based “Band-Aids” to
address the systemic and institutional cancer of poverty in
America.
Ford Foundation President Darren Walker has recently called
for America to reimagine a new gospel of wealth, one that
recognizes that we live in a more enlightened and egalitarian
world than that of Andrew Carnegie.17 In the spirit of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.,18 Darren Walker argues that we can no longer
structural racism in America” and “has primarily focused on decrying the extrajudicial
killings of Black people by law enforcement officers, and racial injustices perpetuated by
the criminal justice system (e.g. racial profiling, police brutality, mass incarceration, etc.)”);
see generally POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT 33–34,
95–97 (Angela J. Davis, ed., 2017) (discussing, among other topics, racial inequality in the
justice system and racial profiling).
14. See Giving Statistics, CHARITY NAVIGATOR https://www.charitynavigator.org/
index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=42 [https://perma.cc/ZS7D-BVM2] (last visited Aug. 25,
2018) [hereinafter Giving Statistics] (showing that in 2017, American education charities
received $58.9 billion (up 6.2% from 2016 and 14% of all domestic donation)); NAT’L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2017-051, STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE
EDUCATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS 2017 90–93 (2017) (showing that blacks lagged
behind other racial groups in college enrollment following high school graduation and in
overall college enrollment).
15. See Giving Statistics, supra note 14 (showing that in 2017, American healthcare
charities received $38.27 billion (up 15.5% from 2016 and 9% of all domestic donation)); see
generally DAYNA BOWEN MATTHEW, JUST MEDICINE: A CURE FOR RACIAL INEQUALITY IN
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 57 (2015) (describing the racial gap in healthcare).
16. The racial wealth gap in America continues to grow exponentially, leaving many
low-income communities of color both frustrated and demoralized. See Dedrick AsanteMuhammad et al., The Road to Zero Wealth: How the Racial Wealth Divide Is Hollowing
Out
America’s
Middle
Class,
INST.
FOR
POL’Y
STUDIES
5
(2017),
https://prosperitynow.org/files/PDFs/10-2017_Road_to_Zero_Wealth_Slides.pdf
[https://perma.cc/946S-P27S ] (“If the racial wealth divide is left unaddressed and is not
exacerbated further over the next eight years, median Black household wealth is on a path
to hit zero by 2053—about 10 years after it is projected that racial minorities will comprise
the majority of the nation’s population. Median Latino household wealth is projected to hit
zero twenty years later, or by 2073. In sharp contrast, median White household wealth
would climb to $137,000 by 2053 and $147,000 by 2073.”); see generally MEHRSA
BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP 165, 249–
51 (2017).
17. See Walker, supra note 2.
18. In 1968, shortly before his assassination, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. launched
the Poor People’s Movement as a hallmark of the Southern Christian Leadership
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simply grapple with the what of social injustice; we must also
unearth and dissect the how and the why of systemic social and
economic inequality.19 Philanthropists and socially conscious
investors have recently praised an emerging social finance
innovation as perhaps a step in the right direction toward this new
gospel of wealth. Specifically, a growing community of socially
conscious private investors, aptly called impact investors,20 has
started to invest in a new social finance tool called the social
impact bond (“SIB”). The SIB, a type of “pay-for-success” contract,
works by establishing mission-driven partnerships between the
public sector, the philanthropic sector, and the private sector.21
Private investors commit to making strategic investments toward
social welfare programs with predetermined timelines and
established performance benchmarks.22 An intermediary
organization coordinates the operation of the SIB and plays a
central role in selecting service providers who facilitate SIB
programs.23 At the completion of a SIB program, if the service
providers have successfully met the established performance
benchmarks as assessed by an independent evaluator, the
government stakeholder repays the impact investors their original
investment along with a return on their investment based upon
governmental cost savings.24 Uniquely, if the SIB program is
deemed unsuccessful after its metric-based evaluation has been
completed, some impact investors are not repaid. Instead, based
upon the terms of the SIB contract, impact investors assume the
financial risks of the SIB investment and take a monetary loss.25
Conference’s economic justice strategy, demanding an economic “Bill of Rights,” among
other demands. See GERALD D. MCKNIGHT, THE LAST CRUSADE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,
THE FBI, AND THE POOR PEOPLE’S CAMPAIGN 20 (1998).
19. See Walker, supra note 2.
20. See Chelsea McGrath, The Government’s Role in Unleashing Impact Investing’s
Full Potential, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 799, 803 (2017) (“Impact investing refers to ‘investments
made into companies, organizations, and funds with the intention to generate social and
economic impact alongside a financial return.’”); see also Susan R. Jones, Is Social
Innovation Financing Through Social Impact Bonds the Last Hope for Community
Economic Development Programs During the Trump Administration?, 26 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUN. DEV. L. 351, 357 (2017) (“Impact investors are diverse, ranging from
pension funds, financial advisors, family foundations, and institutions to government
investors and nonprofit organizations.”).
21. See Emily Gustafsson-Wright et al., The Potential and Limitations of Impact
Bonds: Lessons from the First Five Years of Experience Worldwide, BROOKINGS 1, 4, 6–7
(July 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Impact-Bondsweb.pdf
[https://perma.cc/URW7-5QU3].
22. See McGrath, supra note 20, at 809−10.
23. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 6−7.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 15.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3275634

4-Toussaint v3 (Do Not Delete)

2018

9/21/2018 3:49 PM

THE NEW GOSPEL OF WEALTH

159

There is much to applaud regarding the new SIB model. By
aligning private sector capital from the impact-investing
community with underfunded social welfare programs, SIBs offer
the prospect of both financial and social returns for private
investors, while also helping to address the critical social welfare
issues of our time.26 And, despite much debate over the benefits
and drawbacks of the SIB model, the financial tool is increasingly
being used by governments across the globe to address an eclectic
array of social challenges, including prisoner recidivism, adoption
and long-term foster care placement, services for struggling
families to avoid foster care, homelessness, and services for
disadvantaged and at-risk youth.27 The SIB model has already
been used to successfully fund interventions that either go beyond
core governmental services or combine existing governmental
services in unique ways.28
Further, the SIB model addresses a longstanding challenge
26. Impact investments are commonly defined as “investments intended to create
positive impact beyond financial return.” NICK O’DONOHOE ET AL., J.P. MORGAN GLOB.
RESEARCH & THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND., IMPACT INVESTMENTS: AN EMERGING ASSET
CLASS 14 (2010), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/socialfinance/document/
impact_investments_nov2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U28-WQCU]. However, unlike
traditional impact investments that ask investors to trade lower social returns for higher
financial gain, the SIB directly correlates financial and social returns, with the amount of
financial return dependent upon the amount of social good created by the SIB program.
Deborah Burand, Globalizing Social Finance: How Social Impact Bonds and Social Impact
Performance Guarantees Can Scale Development, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 447, 461−462 (2013).
27. See McGrath, supra note 20, at 855 (“There is SIB activity in Australia, Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Israel, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Peru, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.”);
Jennifer Giovannitti & Joshua Ogburn, Growing the Pipeline of Pay-for-Success Projects,
COMMUNITY PRAC. PAPERS, Feb. 2018, at 1, https://www.richmondfed.org//media/richmondfedorg/publications/community_development/practice_papers/2018/practi
ce_papers_2018-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZM7D-ACAV] (noting that “there are 20 PFS
projects in the United States ([over] 100 across the globe) that are considered launched,
meaning the feasibility and structuring processes are complete, and investors have agreed
to the formal structure and terms. These projects cross a range of issue areas, including
early childhood, workforce development, recidivism, homelessness and many others”).
Additionally, the SIB model has branched into the international development and
humanitarian aid market as well through the “development impact bond” and the
“humanitarian impact bond”. See generally CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV. & SOC. FIN., INVESTING
IN SOCIAL OUTCOMES: DEVELOPMENT IMPACT BONDS (Oct. 2013), https://www.cgdev.org/
topics/development-impact-bonds [https://perma.cc/R4QQ-PRHG]; see also The World’s
First “Humanitarian Impact Bond” Launched to Transform Financing of Aid in ConflictHit
Countries,
INT’L COMM’N OF THE RED CROSS
(Sept.
6,
2017),
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/worlds-first-humanitarian-impact-bond-launchedtransform-financing-aid-conflict-hit [https://perma.cc/6S4B-VML7].
28. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 13−14 (“For example, pre-primary
education, mentoring for youth, and family therapy are all high-impact, cross sector
interventions that fall outside core government services and where service provision by
nongovernmental organizations is common, if not the norm.”).
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for development practitioners—identifying how to translate
impact investments in social infrastructure29 into tangible
financial vehicles that can monetize their latent economic value.
This challenge has persisted, principally because governments
often lack the public resources or political will to “invest in the
future,” notwithstanding proven research indicating that
preventative, forward-looking social welfare programs often
reduce public expenditures in the long run.30 Additionally, public
policy interventions for our nation’s most vulnerable citizens—
such as the formerly incarcerated, the homeless, or the
unemployed⎯are often
politically
unpopular.
Research
demonstrates that political leaders are often unwilling to support
innovative public policy programs that will be implemented or
completed only after they leave office, especially when faced with
the harsh realities of austere fiscal budgets and wide-ranging,
time-sensitive community needs.31 As a result, the emergence of
an economic development platform that facilitates preventative,
forward-looking social welfare programs that stand to bolster
social infrastructure is undoubtedly a step in the right direction.
This Article highlights several benefits of the SIB model and
29. Unlike the physical infrastructure projects that are often the focus of
conventional economic development programs, social infrastructure projects seek to
empower low-income families and marginalized individuals with the tools necessary to
better their lives in the communities where they live by making investments into their
health, education, and employment prospects. See GEORGIA LEVENSON KEOHANE, CAPITAL
AND THE COMMON GOOD: HOW INNOVATIVE FINANCE IS TACKLING THE WORLD’S MOST
URGENT PROBLEMS 148–49, 162 (2016).
30. Government spending is often targeted toward “crisis-driven services” that stand
to yield results within one fiscal year. See Rebecca Leventhal, Effecting Progress: Using
Social Impact Bonds to Finance Social Services, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 511, 523–24 (2013);
see also Toussaint, supra note 13, at 78 (“[G]overnment-sponsored social service programs
are historically remedial in nature, targeting social problems as they arise or after they
have materialized in communities.”). However, spending on preventative programs can
yield long-term positive impacts. For example, vaccinations have long been proven a far
more cost-effective public health intervention than treating diseases after an outbreak or
pandemic. See KEOHANE, supra note 29, at 162. Additionally, investments in high-quality
early childhood education, particularly for low-income children in vulnerable communities,
have been shown to not only improve life prospects but also reduce government funding
allocated toward remediation services. Id. at 163; see also Benjamin R. Cox, Financing
Homelessness Prevention Programs with Social Impact Bonds, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
959, 968 (2012) (explaining that “[t]he SIB structure redirects money from safety-net
programs to more effective early-intervention programs”).
31. See PETER UTTING, SOCIAL AND SOLIDARITY ECONOMY: BEYOND THE FRINGE?, 6
(Zed Books 2015) (“Ongoing constraints associated with market forces, neoliberal ideology
and conditionality have restricted social spending by governments, thereby opening up the
space for non-state actors to engage in social service provisioning and ‘proximity services.’”).
See also Leventhal, supra note 30, at 523–24; Jonathan Boston, How to Overcome Political
Myopia, STATECRAFTING (Oct. 11, 2016), https://statecrafting.net/how-to-overcomepolitical-myopia-73b5567c7179 [https://perma.cc/2WST-3BXE].
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stands alongside economic development practitioners, public
policy experts, and legal scholars who emphasize its potential for
meaningful long-term social impact.32
Nevertheless, while the SIB model seems to integrate some of
the best features of traditional “place-based”33 and “peoplebased”34 approaches to economic development, as this Article
reveals, critical challenges have plagued the development of the
SIB model and may hinder its broader adoption by communities
across America. Specifically, the SIB is built upon a familiar
market-based model of economic development that frequently
deprioritizes the role of community stakeholders, hinders
democratic engagement, and ultimately stymies long-term social
and economic justice. Further, key flaws inherent in the design of
the SIB model, including its neoliberal emphasis on market-based
economic development strategies and its disregard for the primary
role of government in the protection and advancement of the public
good, point toward the need for a more progressive economic
development framework that can overcome some of the
32. See Jones, supra note 20, at 353; see also Burand, supra note 26, at 450; Shaifali
Baliga, Shaping the Success of Social Impact Bonds in the United States: Lessons Learned
from the Privatization of U.S. Prisons, 63 DUKE L.J. 437, 442–45 (2013); Kevin W.
Humphries, Not Your Older Brother’s Bonds: The Use and Regulation of Social-Impact
Bonds in the United States, 76 L. & CONTEMP.PROBS., 433, 435–38 (2014); Pandey et al.,
Use of Social Impact Bonds to Address Social Problems: Understanding Contractual Risks
and Transaction Costs, 28 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 511, 512–16, 524–26
(2018), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323387675_Use_of_Social_Impact_
Bonds_to_Address_Social_Problems_Understanding_Contractual_Risks_and_Transaction
_Costs [https://perma.cc/CJ2J-XQJG].
33. Under this strategy, laws and public policies were crafted to improve the places
where marginalized neighborhoods existed, typically providing private investors with
economic incentives to build affordable housing for low-income residents and bring
commercial opportunities to distressed neighborhoods. For a brief discussion of the history
of community economic development programs in America, see generally Roger A. Clay, Jr.
and Susan R. Jones, A Brief History of Community Economic Development, 18 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUN. DEV. L. 257, 259–65 (2009). However, legal scholars
have noted that place-based economic development programs have often led to less than
favorable outcomes for minority communities. See, e.g., Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space
and Place: The Geography of Economic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 332 (1999)
(explaining that although “urban renewal certainly allowed cities to transform their
economies in the light of the disappearance of manufacturing jobs, a great many of the
newly created jobs benefitted primarily suburban commuters.” Additionally, “urban
renewal often eliminated poor and working-class neighborhoods and replaced them with
high rise, luxury structures for the more affluent while concentrating public housing sites
within black neighborhoods”).
34. Observing that place-based programs were often economically inefficient and
failed to promote racial integration, some economic development advocates have promoted
a “people-based” approach to poverty that focused on helping marginalized families move
themselves into low-poverty, “high opportunity” suburbs. See generally Greg J. Duncan &
Anita Zuberi, Mobility Lessons from Gautreaux and Moving to Opportunity, 1 NW. J.L. &
SOC. POL’Y 110, 113–19 (2006).
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deficiencies of our global capitalist economic system. Such a
reimagined economic development framework can help guide the
SIB toward achieving lasting social justice.
Part II of this Article begins with a brief overview of the
emerging SIB model, discussing the fundamentals of the financial
tool and exploring its purpose amidst a dominant pro-business
dogma of free-market fundamentalism35 and a hidebound
neoliberal political ideology36 that have come to define American
political and economic life. This part then transitions into a brief
political history of the SIB in the U.S., capturing how the
persistence, diligence, and innovation of the Obama
administration have paved the way for recent SIB legislation
under President Donald Trump.
Part III of this Article discusses how the SIB model has been
utilized in the criminal justice sector through a discussion of two
of the earliest SIB programs: (A) the Peterborough Prison SIB in
the United Kingdom; and (B) the Rikers Island Prison SIB in the
United States. Part III then explores some of the potential
opportunities offered by the SIB model, including: (A) the
expansion of investment capital for social innovation; (B) the
transfer of investment risk from the public sector to the private
sector; and (C) the prioritization of evidence-based preventative
social welfare programs.
Part IV follows by touching on some of the challenges facing
the future of SIBs, including: (A) the transaction complexity of SIB
deals, which may hinder their feasibility for under-resourced
governments; (B) the execution risks that arise during the
implementation of complex SIB deals, which vary based upon the
resources of each community and the stakeholders involved; and
(C) the political risks associated with SIBs, which can hinder longterm government support and private sector buy-in.
In conclusion, this Article calls for scholars to envision a more
progressive economic
development framework
in the
35. See CORNELL WEST, DEMOCRACY MATTERS: WINNING THE FIGHT AGAINST
IMPERIALISM 4−5 (2004) (explaining that free-market fundamentalism renders “moneydriven, poll-obsessed elected officials deferential to corporate goals of profit often at the cost
of the common good” while placing “a premium on the activities of buying and selling,
consuming and taking, promoting and advertising, and devalu[ing] community,
compassionate charity, and improvement of the general quality of life”).
36. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005) (explaining that
under neoliberal orthodoxy, “[s]tate interventions in markets (once created) must be kept
to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess
enough information to second-guess market signal (prices) and because powerful interest
groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for
their own benefit”).
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implementation of the SIB model, one that incorporates a greater
emphasis on economic justice and democratic engagement. Much
like earlier “place-based” and “people-based” economic
development strategies,37 the new SIB model focuses on providing
much-needed social benefits to marginalized communities yet fails
to wrestle with much deeper barriers to economic empowerment
grounded in historic racial segregation, ongoing racial injustice,
and America’s unrelenting commitment to a hegemonic, global
capitalist system. A more progressive “justice-based” economic
development framework guiding SIB implementation would seek
to address the fatal flaw of many traditional philanthropic and
economic development innovations⎯they are fundamentally
designed to economically benefit the wealthy through marginal
improvements in the lives of the poor and do little to change to the
status quo of wealth inequality in America.38 This Article
affirmatively rejects the assertion of Andrew Carnegie that a
capitalist system that breeds inequality is “beyond our power to
alter, and therefore to be accepted and made the best of.”39 Instead,
as Ford Foundation President Darren Walker remarks in his
reimagined “gospel of wealth” for the 21st century, “we are
obligated to strengthen and improve the system of which we are
part.”40
II. THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS
Economic development practitioners and socially conscious
investors seeking to address urban poverty and other social ills
have traditionally relied upon public-private partnerships to
develop infrastructure projects in marginalized communities.
Many of these projects are still in existence today and in many
37. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
38. See Scott L. Cummings, Between Markets and Politics: A Response to Porter’s
Competitive Advantage Thesis, 82 OR. L. REV. 901, 913 (2003) (“The issue identified by
scholars has been that oftentimes subsidies are used to attract development that not only
does little for low-income communities, but has dubious overall effects on city-wide
prosperity.”); see also McFarlane, supra note 33, at 333 (“Poor inner-city neighborhoods
have not benefitted from the economic development going on around them because
economic development promotes capital accumulation and mobility that intentionally
bypasses poor neighborhoods.”); Balgia, supra note 32, at 460–61.
39. See CARNEGIE, supra note 4, at 1–2.
40. Darren Walker, Toward a New Gospel of Wealth, EQUALS CHANGE BLOG (Oct. 1,
2015), https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/toward-a-newgospel-of-wealth/ [https://perma.cc/T5WA-6Z5H].
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ways, have come to define the landscape of urban development
policy.41 However, many of these same advocates have recently
begun using similar public-private partnership models to finance
new social infrastructure projects, tackling a wide range of urban
development challenges, from the reduction of recidivism to the
development of social welfare services for the homeless and
disadvantaged youth. The impact investing community has taken
a leadership role in bringing together the public, private, and
philanthropic sectors to leverage private investment capital in
support of these public-private partnerships. Recent attention has
focused on an emerging market-based economic development
model, the social impact bond (“SIB”).42 The SIB, a type of “payfor-success” contract for social welfare programs funded by impact
investors,43 has been declared a promising economic development
strategy that can drive much-needed investment capital toward
some of the most debilitating and entrenched social welfare
problems facing America today.44
Under the SIB model, government stakeholders, private
foundations, nonprofit organizations, and private investors form
contractual partnerships to finance and facilitate social welfare
programs in marginalized communities with underserved
41. See Burand, supra note 26, at 449 (“Governments have long used public/private
partnerships to crowd private sector resources—both financial resources and know-how—
into building large-scale infrastructure projects.”).
42. See Emily Gustafsson-Wright & Izzy Boggild-Jones, Paying for Social Outcomes:
A Review of the Global Impact Bond Market in 2017, BROOKINGS: BLOG (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/education-plus-development/2018/01/17/paying-for-socialoutcomes-a-review-of-the-global-impact-bond-market-in-2017/ [https://perma.cc/SWL4E9YH] (“2017 was an exciting year for social and development impact bonds around the
globe, with 32 new contracts signed. This brings the total up to 108 contracted impact bonds
globally, along with many more in design.”).
43. Interestingly, the SIB is not actually a “bond” but a financial tool far similar to
bridge financing. See Steven Godeke & Lyel Resner, Building A Healthy and Sustainable
Social Impact Bond: The Investor Landscape, GODEKE CONSULTING 5 (Nov. 2012),
http://connecticutcenter.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/The-Investor-Landscape.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7KZV-86RD] (arguing that the term “social impact bond” is a misnomer
because SIBs do not share typical bond features such as scheduled principal payments and
designated interest rates).
44. See JEFFREY LIEBMAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: A
PROMISING NEW FINANCING MODEL TO ACCELERATE SOCIAL INNOVATION AND IMPROVE
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 29 (2011), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/
uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/social_impact_bonds.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PTG-LSCT]
(concluding that “any new policy tool with the potential to accelerate solutions in even a
subset of our nation’s most pressing social problems is an important breakthrough—one
that deserves careful consideration from the policymaking, philanthropic, and investment
communities”).
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populations. Much like the “place-based” Low Income Housing Tax
Credit program initiated by President Ronald Reagan,45 or the
various “place-based” development programs instituted under
President Bill Clinton, including the Empowerment Zone
Program,46 the HOPE VI program (and later, the Choice
Neighborhoods program),47 and the New Market Tax Credit
Program,48 the SIB model offers private investors an opportunity
to profit from strategic investments into the communities of
marginalized, low-income Americans. However, the SIB also
adopts the ideology of “people-based” economic development
strategies. Much like the Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program,
which spanned several decades from the ’70s into the ’90s, and the
HUD Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing program, which was
instituted during President George H. W. Bush’s administration,49
45. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the federal government created the LowIncome Housing Tax Credit program, which provides tax incentives to encourage private
developers to create affordable rental housing for low-income Americans. See I.R.C. § 42
(2012); see also David Philip Cohen, Improving the Supply of Affordable Housing: The Role
of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 537, 537−39 (1998).
46. In 1993, Congress created the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Cities
Demonstration Program, which was designed to create jobs and stimulate business
investments in economically distressed urban communities through a combination of grant
and tax credits. See McFarlane, supra note 33, at 296−97. The zones were designed to be
areas of democratic governance and participatory community decision-making. See id. at
297.
47. Under the HOPE VI program (enacted in 1992 under Section 24 of the Housing
Act of 1937, ch. 896, § 24, 50 Stat. 888, 899, amended by Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act of 1998 § 535, 42 U.S.C. § 1437v (2010)) and later the Choice
Neighborhoods grant program, the federal government provided public subsidies to private
developers to redevelop struggling public housing developments into new high-quality
mixed-income developments. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., Hope VI Program
Authority and Funding History (Mar. 2007), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents//DOC_9
838.PDF [https://perma.cc/NLP9-TSLQ].
48. Established as part of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, the New
Markets Tax Credit Program sought to incentivize commercial and mixed-use real estate
investments in distressed, low-income communities through a federal tax credit.
Administered by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Community Development Financial
Institution (CDFI) Fund and allocated by local Community Development Entities (CDEs)
across America, the NMTC awarded $1 billion in allocation to CDEs during the first year
of the program, enabling investors to reduce their federal tax liability by $390 million (39%
of the amount invested into CDEs) over a seven-year period. See Janet Thompson Jackson,
Can Free Enterprise Cure Urban Ills?: Lost Opportunities for Business Development in
Urban, Low-Income Communities Through the New Markets Tax Credit Program, 37 U.
MEM. L. REV. 659, 692−99 (2007) (discussing the origins of the New Markets Tax Credit
Program).
49. See generally Greg J. Duncan & Anita Zuberi, Mobility Lessons from Gautreaux
and Moving to Opportunity, 1 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 110, 110–22 (2006) (providing an
“update on Gautreaux lessons” and comparing “its sister program, Moving on
Opportunity”).
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the SIB model delivers critical resources into the hands of
marginalized individuals who need help in their quest toward
achieving the American Dream.
Thus, the SIB model seems to strike a middle ground in the
historic Community Economic Development (“CED”) debate,50
prioritizing both the private investor and the low-income recipient
of invested funds.51 However, under the SIB model, private
investors not only directly fund economic development through
their support of social welfare programs administered by service
providers, they also bear the financial risks of those impact
investments. Indeed, SIB investors are only rewarded with a
return on their capital investment if the social welfare programs
sponsored by the SIB have been deemed successful.52 This is
noteworthy because the philanthropic community often lacks the
necessary investment capital to scale proven social programs or to
fill the governmental funding gap during times of fiscal austerity
or budgetary constraints.53 Moreover, when philanthropists fail to
provide multi-year funding support, nonprofit service providers
often struggle to sustain their social impact efforts.54 As a result,
the SIB has garnered much attention and has been heralded for
its multi-stakeholder approach that can help overcome
government funding constraints and political divides. While the
SIB model is still in its infancy, there has been growing interest
across the globe in its potential to address diverse social and
economic challenges in education, employment, criminal justice,
and social welfare.55

50. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Essay: Reconciling People and Place in
Housing and Community Development Policy, 16 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 5–6 (2009)
(discussing the dichotomy between people-based and place-based policies in community
development policy).
51. This dichotomy is evident in the historic dialogue between Booker T. Washington
and W.E.B. DuBois during the early 1900s over the best strategy to attain economic and
political empowerment for formerly enslaved Africans living in emancipated communities
across America. See Scott Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive
Politics: Towards a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 410
(2002); see Lateef Mtima, African-American Economic Empowerment Strategies for the New
Millennium—Revisiting the Washington-DuBois Dialectic, 42 HOW. L.J. 391, 401−02 (1999).
52. See Jones, supra note 20, at 358.
53. See Toussaint, supra note 13, at 72.
54. See Leventhal, supra note 30, at 527; see also Cox, supra note 30, at 970 (noting
that “[m]ulti-year contracts allow service providers to do more service providing and less
time consuming fundraising”).
55. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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Despite its growing popularity, there has been debate
regarding the fundamental purpose of the SIB. This, in turn, has
influenced the nature of the social welfare programs that have
been funded by SIBs. Some impact investors and SIB advocates
primarily view the SIB as a platform to fill the funding gap for
existing social welfare programs.56 These proven social programs
are viewed as safe investments for private investors, much like
traditional place-based economic development programs,
principally because they are more likely to provide expected
returns when they are either scaled or replicated in new
communities. Conversely, some investors and advocates have
argued that the SIB model should be used to finance innovative
social programs that would otherwise struggle to obtain funding.57
While innovative social programs are often riskier for investors
because they are based upon unproven methodologies or new
theories of poverty alleviation, they often stand to yield
transformational, long-term impacts for the communities they
serve if they are successful. Many of these innovative programs,
taking a page from the people-based approach to economic
development, focus specifically on addressing the unique needs of
the people living in distressed communities.58
Notwithstanding the diversity of perspectives on the purpose
of the SIB, the current implementation of this new economic
development tool largely reflects a neoliberal political ideology
that promotes a market-based approach to economic development,
one grounded in a pervasive dogma of free-market
fundamentalism.59 Consequently, while SIB advocates have
focused on identifying ways to minimize the financial, political,
and execution risks for private investors in an effort to encourage
expansion of the social finance tool, they have paid far less
attention to how the SIB model can be used to facilitate economic
justice, economically empower marginalized communities, and
address our country’s growing wealth gap.
As described below, the earliest SIBs have been used to
56. See Toussaint, supra note 13, at 73.
57. See id. at 74.
58. This is not to suggest that there cannot be innovative social welfare programs
funded by SIBs that focus on empowering communities or addressing community-level
issues.
59. See WEST, supra note 35, at 4−5.
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address the issue of prisoner recidivism by providing formerly
incarcerated individuals—referred to as “returning citizens” in the
criminal justice literature60—with educational resources and job
counseling to help them successfully reintegrate into society and
find gainful employment. Much like the Moving to Opportunity for
Fair Housing “people-based” economic development program, the
resources offered by these criminal justice SIBs can be viewed as
“vouchers” in the hands of returning citizens as they seek a better
life outside of prison. However, the market-based design of many
SIB programs may obscure opportunities to capitalize on existing
community-based assets. Further, they may undermine a critical
need to economically empower existing community members in
marginalized neighborhoods during the development process.
A. An Overview of Social Impact Bonds
The social impact bond, combining elements of results-based
or performance-based financing and public-private partnerships,
is a contractual partnership between public and private
stakeholders that seeks to direct investment capital toward
preventative, forward-looking social welfare programs. In the
United States, this represents an opportunity to direct a small
percentage of the $43 trillion of assets under management by the
private financial sector toward funding social service providers
who are implementing social welfare programs in marginalized,
underserved communities.61 By 2016, four years after the first SIB
was launched in the United States, U.S. SIBs were supported by
$91.9 million in private investments.62 If private resources
continue to be channeled into the impact investing space, there is
a potential for up to $1 trillion of commercial capital over the next
ten years to be applied toward the development of SIBs.63
The traditional SIB model involves six key constituents: (1)
60. See Susan R. Jones, Representing Returning Citizen Entrepreneurs in the Nation’s
Capital, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUN. DEV. L. 45, 46 (2016) (explaining that
“[t]his terminology, designed to be non-stigmatizing in the aftermath of punishments and
debts paid to society, recognizes the need for returning citizens to reintegrate into their
communities, get on with their lives, and become productive members of society”).
61. See Leventhal, supra note 30, at 529.
62. Emily Liner, Social Impact Bonds: A New Model for Investing in Social Services,
THIRD WAY (Sep. 8, 2016), http://www.thirdway.org/report/social-impact-bonds-a-newmodel-for-investing-in-social-services [https://perma.cc/UXB8-7T6P].
63. See Jones, supra note 20, at 378.
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an underserved population; (2) a government entity; (3) impact
investors; (4) social service providers; (5) an intermediary
organization; and (6) a program evaluator.64 First, the SIB model
requires a marginalized or underserved community that stands to
benefit from preventative, forward-looking social services
addressing a specific social welfare problem.65 The community
constituents served by SIB programs are typically underserved or
marginalized individuals who may or may not receive remedial
services from public resources. Second, the SIB model includes a
government contracting authority that serves as the outcome
payer who commits to paying impact investors a return on their
investment based upon the program’s successful achievement of
predefined performance metrics.66 Third, the SIB model includes
a pool of impact investors—including financial institutions,
private investors, private foundations, and mission-driven
philanthropists—who are not only interested in earning a
financial return on their investments but are also dedicated to
funding social programs that service needy populations and
provide a social benefit to society.67 Impact investments provide
the necessary capital to finance SIB programs, as well as cover fees
associated with managing SIB projects and evaluating their
performance after completion. Importantly, impact investors
assume the financial risks of SIB investments as they are only
repaid if the social programs have successfully met predefined
performance metrics after being assessed by an independent
program evaluator.68
Fourth, the SIB model includes social service providers,
frequently nonprofit organizations who are equipped to directly
serve the target population and deliver an evidence-based,
preventative social program that addresses an important social

64. See Laura Callanan et al., From Potential to Action: Bringing Social Impact
Bonds to the US, MCKINSEY & COMPANY 1, 7 (2012), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/
McKinsey/Industries/Social%20Sector/Our%20Insights/From%20potential%20to%20actio
n%20Bringing%20social%20impact%20bonds%20to%20the%20US/From%20potential%20
to%20action%20Bringing%20social%20impact%20bonds%20to%20the%20US.ashx
[https://perma.cc/2JB7-BQVL].
65. See id. at 15.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 14−15.
68. See id. at 15−16.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3275634

4-Toussaint v3 (Do Not Delete)

170

9/21/2018 3:49 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

56:1

welfare issue linked to governmental cost savings.69 Fifth, the SIB
model includes an intermediary organization that collects the
impact investments from private investors, manages the
structuring of the SIB deal between the various stakeholders,
facilitates the distribution of investment capital to social service
providers, coordinates the flow of funds among the SIB
stakeholders during the implementation of the program, and
assists with the monitoring and general oversight of the SIB’s
performance throughout its lifecycle.70 Thus, the intermediary
plays a critical and central role in the lifecycle of every SIB. Sixth,
the SIB model includes a program evaluator who assesses the
success of the social program in meeting predefined performance
metrics. Many SIB models include two distinct evaluator roles: (1)
an independent program evaluator who is responsible for
assessing whether the social service provider has met the
predefined performance metrics; and (2) an evaluation advisor
who helps establish and define assessment metrics and provides
ongoing monitoring of the progress of SIB programs during the
lifecycle of their implementation.71
Although the development process for a SIB transaction is
unique to every deal, the SIB typically goes through four stages of
development. First, the stakeholders conduct a feasibility study,
which both defines the characteristics of the social problem
impacting the target population and determines the feasibility of
the SIB program based upon predefined assessment criteria. To
determine the feasibility of a SIB, stakeholders look for (1)
outcome metrics that are both measurable and meaningful
predictors of the long-term economic impacts of public
expenditures; (2) a reasonable time horizon to achieve the stated
outcomes that align with the goals of impact investors;72 (3)
evidence that service providers can achieve the stated outcomes
through their social programs; and (4) the appropriate political
and legal conditions to facilitate a successful SIB program in a

69. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 24, 29–31, 43–45 (“Service
providers are said to be motivated to join a SIB because it provides them with a stable, longterm revenue stream, allowing them to achieve outcomes, and because a SIB might allow
them to scale a program.”).
70. See id. at 8.
71. See Callanan et al., supra note 64, at 41.
72. See, e.g., Burand, supra note 26, at 456 n.21.
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particular jurisdiction.73
Secondly, the SIB deal is structured by lawyers and impact
investment professionals, an arduous process that involves raising
investment capital, defining the scope of the social intervention,
choosing the outcome metrics that establish the evaluation
methodology, selecting social service providers, and drafting and
negotiating a large volume of complex contracts defining the
relationship among all of the stakeholders.74 The third stage of
development is the implementation stage, which involves the
provision of social welfare services by service providers and the
performance management of the various stakeholders involved in
the SIB deal. Finally, the fourth stage of development involves the
evaluation of the social program’s outcomes and the repayment of
impact investors based on how successfully the program achieved
the predefined performance metrics.75
At the conclusion of successful SIB programs under the
current model’s formulation, the benefits are typically three-fold:
(1) the government constituent reduces the financial risks borne
by taxpayers for the funding of social welfare programs, while
simultaneously prioritizing evidence-based, forward-looking
preventative social programs that offer long-term benefits to
marginalized communities;76 (2) impact investors secure “doublebottom-line” returns on their SIB investments—the achievement
of both social goals and financial return; and (3) social service
providers gain access to additional investment capital to both scale
and sustain multi-year social welfare programs designed to
address some of the most debilitating social challenges of our
time.77
There are two general formulations of the SIB model: (1) the
individual transaction model, which structures the SIB deal
around a single outcome payment contract; and (2) the fund model,
which structures the SIB deal to facilitate multiple outcome
payment contracts through a pool of funds designed to address a
single social welfare problem.78 The United Kingdom is a
73. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 4.
74. In some cases, social services providers are procured early in the SIB development
process. See id at 7.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 25.
77. See Gordon Berlin, Learning from Experience: A Guide to Social Impact Bond
Investing, MDRC 2 (Mar. 2016), http://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/Learning_from_
Experience_SIB.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CVB-CZKY].
78. See Gustafsson-Wright, supra note 21, at 9.
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recognized leader in establishing and promoting the SIB model, in
part due to its development of several SIB funds that have
established a series of SIB transactions addressing employment
and social welfare issues.79 Within the United States, although
both the individual transaction and fund models have been
explored since the launch of the first SIB in New York City in 2012,
there has been greater support for the individual transaction
approach.80 While the fund model has been promoted by the U.S.
federal government and various state and local governments as a
promising strategy for expansion of SIB programs,81 it has also
faced some political opposition.
B. A Brief Political History of SIBs in America
Beginning in 2011 under the administration of President
Barack Obama, the U.S. federal government began taking
legislative steps to promote the development of SIBs and create
the necessary infrastructure for new laws and public policies
designed to support SIB programs. In February 2011, President
Obama included up to $100 million in his proposed fiscal year 2012
budget to support pilot “pay-for-success” programs targeting
issues like recidivism, workforce training, and homelessness.82 In
President Obama’s budgetary proposal for fiscal year 2013, a
similar request to support pay-for-success initiatives was included
with the slightly increased amount of $109 million.83
Unfortunately, a divided Congress did not approve either of these
requests, stalling government action on the development of a
robust SIB ecosystem within the U.S.84
79. See generally Guidance: Social Impact Bonds, GOV.UK (Nov. 16, 2012),
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/social-impact-bonds [https://perma.cc/G54R-RCMN]; see
Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 11, 57.
80. See Liner, supra note 62; PETER RAMDSDEN, OECD, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: STATE
OF PLAY & LESSONS LEARNT 6 (OECD 2016), https://www.oecd.org/cfe/leed/SIBs-State-PlayLessons-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXE5-BTUN].
81. Some states have taken steps to promote the SIB fund model. For example, in
Massachusetts, the state government established a Social Innovation Financing Trust
Fund to support SIB outcome payments in two separate initiatives. However, the model
established in Massachusetts differs from the fund model that is popular in the U.K.
because it does not use the rate card process. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 10, § 35VV
(Supp. 2013); see Burand, supra note 26, at 476−78.
82. Sonal Shah & Kristina Costa, White House Budget Drives Pay for Success and
Social Impact Bonds Forward, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 23, 2013),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2013/04/23/61163/white-housebudget-drives-pay-for-success-and-social-impact-bonds-forward/ [https://perma.cc/AL4YQZPR].
83. Id.
84. See id.
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In its 2014 fiscal year budgetary proposal, President Obama’s
administration again advocated for the development of SIBs,
requesting nearly $500 million in appropriations to support payfor-success programs. This request included a similar proposal as
the previous two years and an additional budget request of $300
million to create the Pay-For-Success Incentive Fund at the U.S.
Department of the Treasury.85 The Pay-For-Success Incentive
Fund was part of the Social Impact Bond Act (H.R. 4885), which
was introduced in June 2014 during the 113th Congress by U.S.
Representatives Todd Young (R-Ind.) and John Delaney (D-Md.)
with support from additional co-sponsors.86 The new fund was
modeled after the United Kingdom’s Social Outcome Fund, which
was designed by the U.K. government to “catalyze and test
innovative approaches to tackling complex issues using outcomes
based commissioning.”87 In July 2014, a companion bill, the Pay
for Performance Act (S. 2691), was introduced in the Senate by
Senators Michael Bennett (D-Colo.) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah).88
This bipartisan support reflected a consensus on the value of
bringing private-sector resources to bear toward proven, evidencebased public service programs.
In 2015, bipartisan pay-for-success funding bills designed to
expand federal support for state and local SIBs were reintroduced
in Congress. Specifically, in March 2015, U.S. Representatives
Todd Young (R-Ind.) and John Delaney (D-Md.) introduced the
Social Impact Partnerships Act (H.R. 1336), and in April 2015,
Senators Michael Bennett (D-Colo.) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)
introduced the Social Impact Partnership Act (S.1089).89
In March 2016, President Obama signed into law the
bipartisan Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission Act of 2016
(P.L. 114-140), jointly sponsored by Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wis.)
and Senator Patty Murray (D-Wash.).90 The commission was
tasked with developing recommendations for incorporating
85. See id.
86. See id.; H.R. 4885, 113th Cong. (2014).
87. See Shah & Costa, supra note 82; for more information, see Commissioning Better
Outcomes
and
the
Social
Outcomes
Fund,
BIG
LOTTERY
FUND,
https://www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/global-content/programmes/england/commissioningbetter-outcomes-and-social-outcomes-fund [https://perma.cc/MF69-MKLG] (last visited
July 18, 2018).
88. S. 2691, 113th Cong. (2014).
89. H.R. 1336, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 1089, 114th Cong. (2015).
90. Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 144-140, 130
Stat. 317; H.R. 1831 (114th): Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission Act of 2016,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1831[https://perma.cc/5PL9R7C3] (last visited July 18, 2018).
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evidence-based policymaking into the design of federal
programs.91 The commission released a final report, “The Promise
of Evidence-Based Policymaking,” in September 2017 with
recommendations on “(1) how the Federal government can provide
the infrastructure for secure access to data, (2) the mechanisms to
improve privacy protections and transparency about the uses of
data for evidence building, and (3) the institutional capacity to
support evidence building.”92
In January 2017, during the 115th Congress and under the
administration of President Donald Trump, building upon the
momentum established during the Obama administration,
Representatives Pat Tiberi (R-Ohio) and John Delaney (D-Md.)
introduced the Social Impact Partnership to Pay for Results Act
(H.R. 576) with bipartisan support.93 In April 2017, Senators Todd
Young (R-Ind.) and Michael Bennet (D-Colo.) introduced another
version of the bill, the Social Impact Partnerships to Pay for
Results Act (S. 963).94 In June 2017, Representative Adrian Smith
(R-Nebr.) introduced the Increasing Opportunity through
Evidence-Based Home Visiting Act (H.R. 2824) to reauthorize the
Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting Program,
which added a pay-for-success component to the funding
allocation.95 In September 2017, a bipartisan group of senators led
by Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) introduced the Strong Families
Act of 2017 (S. 1829), their version of the reauthorization bill.96 In
October 2017, Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) and Senator Patty
Murray (D-Wash.) introduced the Foundations for Evidence-Based
Policymaking Act (H.R. 4174 and S. 2046), the first in a series of
legislative actions designed to implement the recommendations of
the Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking.97
Four years after its initial introduction under the Obama

91. See Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission Act of 2016, 130 Stat. at 318–19;
see Nicole Truhe, State of Play: Pay for Success and Evidence-Based Policy, AM. FORWARD:
BLOG (Dec. 2017), http://www.americaforward.org/state-play-pay-success-evidence-basedpolicy-december-2017/ [https://perma.cc/G4D2-5WKN].
92. COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING, THE PROMISE OF EVIDENCEBASED POLICYMAKING (2017), https://www.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/090617cc
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9AA-NDFK].
93. See Truhe, supra note 91; H.R. 576, 115th Cong. (2017).
94. See Truhe, supra note 91; S. 963, 115th Cong. (2017).
95. See Nicole Truhe, State of Play: Pay for Success and Evidence-Based Policy,
February 2018, AM. FORWARD: BLOG (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.americaforward.org/stateplay-pay-success-evidence-based-policy-february-2018/ [https://perma.cc/6XTT-RVVL];
H.R. 2824, 115th Cong. (2017).
96. See Truhe, supra note 91.
97. See id.; H.R. 4174, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 2046, 115th Cong. (2017).
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administration, the Social Impact Partnerships to Pay for Results
Act was finally included as Section 50801 of the Bipartisan Budget
Act of 2018 and was signed into law by President Trump on
February 9, 2018.98 One of the first statutory deadlines is
associated with naming members to the Commission on Social
Impact Partnerships.99 Additionally, the reauthorization of the
Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting Program,
including its pay-for-success provision, was included as Section
50601 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.100 The Trump
administration’s most recent fiscal year 2019 budget proposal
includes a chapter entitled “Building and Using Evidence to
Improve Government Effectiveness,” which includes various ideas
and themes from the Commission on Evidence-Based
Policymaking’s final report.101
In addition to requesting funding through the appropriations
process, the federal government under the Obama administration
took substantive steps to encourage innovation in the financing
and implementation of social welfare programs. In 2009, the
Obama administration created the Office of Social Innovation and
Civic Participation “to advance opportunity, equality, and justice
by creating a more outcomes-driven government and social
sector.”102 In April of that same year, President Obama signed into
law the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act, which established
the White House Social Innovation Fund (“SIF”) within the
Corporation for National and Community Service, a “nearly $1
billion social impact incubator . . . creating more than 450 publicprivate partnerships that deliver high-impact, community-based
solutions that work.”103 The SIF launched its first competition in
98. See Truhe, supra note 95; H.R. 1892, 115th Cong. (2017).
99. See State of Play: Pay for Success and Evidence-Based Policy, AM. FORWARD: BLOG
(May 2018), http://www.americaforward.org/state-of-play-pay-for-success-and-evidencebased-policy-may-2018/ [https://perma.cc/S8WK-C8UZ] [hereinafter State of Play: Pay for
Success and Evidence-Based Policy].
100. See Truhe, supra note 95; H.R. 1892, 115th Cong. (2017).
101. See Truhe, supra note 95.
102. Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation, WHITE HOUSE,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/sicp [https://perma.cc/5QB85JAU] (last visited Sept. 6, 2018).
103. See Federal Agency Announces $13 Million in Funding to Support Pay for Success
Projects,
CORPORATION
FOR
NAT’L
&
COMTY
SERV.
(Nov.
3,
2016),
https://www.nationalservice.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/federal-agency-announces13-million-funding-support-pay-success [https://perma.cc/9KHV-J9YT]; Christi Goldfuss &
David Wilkinson, Pay for Success: New Resources for Better Conservation Outcomes, WHITE
HOUSE (Dec. 17, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/12/17/pay-success
[https://perma.cc/34Q2CPF3]; Social Innovation Fund, WHITE HOUSE,https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/administration/eop/sicp/initiatives/social-innovation-fund [https://
perma.cc/43PC-NME5] (last visited July 21, 2018) [hereinafter Social Innovation Fund].
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April of 2010, awarding 11 intermediary grantees that funded
more than 150 sub-grantees serving low-income communities.104
In 2014, the White House SIF awarded grants to eight
organizations to promote the development of SIBs in the U.S.,
including the Harvard Kennedy School’s Social Impact Bond
Technical Assistance Lab.105
President Obama’s 2016 fiscal budget included $70 million
dollars allocated toward the SIF and proposed that 20% be made
available for pay-for-success projects.106 In April 2016, the
Corporation for National and Community Service announced 25
SIB pay-for-success competition sub-awards.107 There have also
been a few recent initiatives funded by SIF. Through a three-year,
$2.4 million SIF grant issued in 2016, Third Sector Capital
Partners, Inc. and Actionable Intelligence for Social Policy (AISP)
at the University of Pennsylvania are providing several
governments with technical assistance to develop evidence-based
social programs.108 Additionally, Social Finance announced the
second round of the Outcomes Rate Card Development
Competition, and JPAL North America announced the third round
of the J-PAL State and Local Innovation Initiative, both designed
to incentivize governments to create new pay-for-successprograms.109
Other governmental agencies have also begun to incorporate
the SIB framework into their grant programs, including the
Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, the Office of
Management and Budget, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and the Department of Education.110 Alongside the
104.
105.
106.

Social Innovation Fund, supra note 103.
See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 34.
See CORP. FOR NAT’L & COMMUNITY SERV., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION: FISCAL YEAR 2016 6, 45, 94−95 (Appendix 1) (2016),
https://www.nationalservice.gov/sites/default/files/page/cncs_2016_CBJ_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PE4B-X2EF].
107. See Truhe, supra note 91.
108. See Emily Wood, Third Sector and AISP Partner with Five Governments to
Improve Outcomes for Vulnerable Families and Children, THIRD SECTOR CAP. PARTNERS
(Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.thirdsectorcap.org/news/third-sector-and-aisp-partner-withfive-governments-to-improve-outcomes-for-vulnerable-families-and-children/ [https://
perma.cc/X78U-NNF8].
109. See Truhe, supra note 91.
110. The U.S. Department of Justice offered “priority consideration” for Second
Chance Act grant applicants in fiscal year 2012 that incorporated pay-for-success program
models in their application. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PAY FOR SUCCESS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S SECOND CHANCE ACT PROGRAMS
NONPROFIT FINANCE FUND AND DOJ WEBINAR RECORDING, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS (FAQS) 1 (2012), https://www.bja.gov/Funding/12PayforSuccessFAQ.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8GR-GLLR]. In 2013, the U.S. Department of Labor announced a $24
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wide-ranging efforts of the federal government to develop a SIB
ecosystem in the U.S., various state and local jurisdictions have
also explored the SIB as a promising CED tool to address poverty
and
other
social
challenges
impacting
marginalized
communities.111 Nevertheless, despite praiseworthy efforts by the
government at both the federal and state levels, the SIB model has
not yet been widely endorsed as a tool to empower marginalized
communities, nor as a dominant strategy to address systemic
social and economic inequality.
C. The Purpose of Social Impact Bonds
There are competing ideas about the fundamental purpose of
the social impact bond. Scholars have divided SIB programs into
three general categories: (1) untested, innovative social welfare
programs; (2) existing social welfare programs with mixed results
about their effectiveness when implemented on a limited, large
scale; and (3) existing social welfare programs with very strong
evidence of success and the likelihood of greater social impact

million Workforce Innovation Fund to fund pilot pay-for-success programs that provide
employment services to returning citizens. See News Release: US Labor Department
Awards Nearly $24 Million in Pay for Success Grants, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Sept. 23, 2013),
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/eta/eta20131936 [https://perma.cc/89YV-NYBV].
Also, in 2013, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development announced that it
would provide up to $5 billion in grant dollars to assist with redevelopment efforts in the
areas impacted by Hurricane Sandy and encouraged the five impacted states to incorporate
pay-for-success strategies where applicable. See Jonathan Greenblatt, Building a Smarter,
More Efficient Government through “Pay for Success”, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 20, 2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/11/20/building-smarter-more-efficient-governmentthrough-pay-success [https://perma.cc/TLW6-CYTA]. In October 2017, the Department of
Education released a Pay for Success Feasibility Toolkit. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PAY FOR
SUCCESS FEASIBILITY TOOLKIT: CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL LEADERS (2017),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/inits/ed/pay-for-success/pay-for-success-toolkit.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4MWT-BJYQ].
111. Washington D.C. and 29 states have explored pay-for-success programs. See Pay
for Success Activity Map, NONPROFIT FIN. FUND, http://www.payforsuccess.org/activity
[https://perma.cc/LX2Y-YK7U] (last visited July 22, 2018). Currently, over 20 pay-forsuccess projects have been launched in the United States, with the most recent projects in
Alameda County, Cal., Los Angeles County, Cal., Ventura County, Cal., and King County,
Wash. See Truhe, supra note 91; see Chicago Child-Parent Center Pay for Success
Initiative, NONPROFIT FIN. FUND , http://www.payforsuccess.org/project/chicago-childparent-center-pay-success-initiative [https://perma.cc/6MMF-MZ5G] (last updated Oct. 17,
2017); see Utah High Quality Preschool Program, NONPROFIT FIN. FUND,
http://www.payforsuccess.org/project/utah-high-quality-preschool-program [https://perma
.cc/8YWR-5STE] (last updated July 2, 2018). Additionally, some state legislatures have
considered establishing pay-for-success funds to support future pilot projects. See State of
Play: Pay for Success and Evidence-Based Policy, supra note 99. Colorado recently passed
legislation to establish a pay-for-success fund to support three pilot projects targeting youth
involved in child welfare and criminal justice systems. Id.
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when operated at a larger scale.112 The types of social welfare
programs that are ultimately funded by SIBs reflect the risk
appetite of impact investors as they seek to balance financial risks
with opportunities for social reward.113
Some impact investors view SIBs primarily as a funding
platform for innovative, unproven social welfare programs that
merit testing on a larger scale but are unlikely to be funded by
government stakeholders because of their high-risk profile.114
These SIB investors prioritize risky investments, much like
venture philanthropists and private equity investors, principally
because such investments offer the prospect of large returns. This
perspective is not without its benefits. Meaningful social progress
for marginalized populations undoubtedly requires new ideas and
unproven, yet promising, development strategies. Further, the
private sector is potentially in the best position to bear the
financial risk of unproven social programs because of its access to
market capital. This investment strategy can also save
governments from using limited taxpayer dollars to fund social
welfare programs that may prove to be ineffective, while still
encouraging the kind of social innovation that yields long-term
benefits for society.115
However, there are some impact investors and SIB advocates
who alternatively view the SIB model as a new tool to help
governments meet the funding gap for existing, proven social
welfare programs with strong evidence for success.116 Under this
112. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 9.
113. There has been variety on how SIBs are structured globally that reflects an
appetite for financial risk versus a commitment to social rewards. The investment
structures of existing SIBs vary in their similarity to debt—meaning, a more conservative
investment with fixed repayment timelines and interest rates—versus equity—meaning, a
riskier investment structure where repayment and interest rates are impacted by the
performance of the fund recipient. While in the United States many SIBs have been
structured like debt instruments, in the United Kingdom, many SIB deals are structured
like equity investments. As a result, SIBs in the U.S. tend to include a larger upfront capital
commitment from investors, whereas in the U.K., capital recycling is more common,
meaning that early payments to funders are reinvested into the SIB program to help
finance ongoing operating costs. Additionally, SIB deals in the U.S. tend to include
subordinate investments, grants, and investment guarantees more frequently than in other
countries. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 15−16.
114. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 8−9.
115. See Max Liang et al., An Overview of Social Impact Bonds, 13 J. INT’L BUS. & L.
267, 273 (2014).
116. Impact investors exhibit diverse expectations for financial and social return.
While some impact investors are staunchly “impact” oriented and willing to sacrifice
financial returns to achieve social gain, others believe that their financial returns should
not be sacrificed when investing in social programs. See YASMIN SALTUK ET AL., J.P.
MORGAN GLOB. SOC. FIN., PERSPECTIVES ON PROGRESS: THE IMPACT INVESTOR SURVEY,
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conception of SIBs, the model provides investment capital for lowrisk, proven social welfare programs that can benefit communities
when operated at scale, while also providing expected returns for
impact investors.117 This investment strategy is similar to that
adopted by many traditional CED lenders who seek to empower
marginalized communities through established, market-driven
government programs that offer guaranteed returns or predefined
tax benefits to investors.118
Although seemingly less risky for impact investors, the
strategy of prioritizing proven programs has its shortcomings.
While it may attract a large volume of investments from the
private sector, it can obscure the role of the government as the
primary advocate for, and protector of, the public welfare. By
privatizing the provision of social welfare services that are
typically managed by governmental constituents, the government
may unintentionally empower the private sector to dictate the
landscape of social welfare issues that receive public funding. As a
result, politically unpopular or challenging social welfare services
that offer uncertain financial returns for impact investors, or that
lack clear solutions that can be easily translated into evidencebased social welfare programs with quantifiable performance
metrics, may be overlooked and remain underfunded.119
30 (2013), https://thegiin.org/assets/documents/Perspectives%20on%20Progress2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3D6U-HLSZ] (noting that nearly two-thirds of the 99 impact investors
surveyed target market financial returns for their impact investments); see Burand, supra
note 26, at 461−62; see also Paula Lantz & Samantha Iovan, When Does Pay-for-Success
Make
Sense?,
STAN.
SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.
(Dec.
12,
2017),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/when_does_pay_for_success_make_sense# [https://perma.cc/
G2KZ-L7L7] (“It is difficult to justify the resources, risks, and opportunity costs of PFS
initiatives when an intervention has no evidence base or when existing evidence raises red
flags about the impact of a program.”).
117. While SIBs were historically conceptualized as a vehicle to finance innovative
new approaches to complex social problems, in practice, many of the early SIB deals have
focused on supporting programs that offer strong evidence of success. See Berlin, supra note
77, at 9. Both the Peterborough SIB and the Rikers Island SIB prioritized service providers
with a proven track record of success. See generally SOC. FIN., THE ONE* SERVICE. ONE
YEAR ON 7, 9 (2011), https://www.socialfinance.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/
sf_peterborough_one-_year_on.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZJ8-GX6E] (explaining the One
Service program funded by the Peterborough SIB); see also Adolescent Behavioral Learning
Experience (ABLE), N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.nyc.gov/html/ymi/downloads/pdf/a
ble.pdf?epi-content=GENERIC [https://perma.cc/Z6ZN-MKGE] (last visited July 19, 2018)
(teaching more about the service program at Rikers Island). Additionally, SIB deals have
structured returns for investors that are more similar to those expected from typical bond
deals. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 9. Of course, scaling “proven” service programs can still
introduce many risks.
118. For example, program-related investments and community loans under the
Community Reinvestment Act. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 8.
119. See Stephen Sinclair et al., Social Impact Bonds: Shifting the Boundaries of
Citizenship, in SOCIAL POLICY REVIEW 26: ANALYSIS AND DEBATE IN SOCIAL POLICY 119,
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Replicating proven social welfare programs in different
communities (or in different populations within an existing
community) may provide great value to local or state governments
by freeing taxpayer dollars to support more innovative public
programs.120 Indeed, this may account for the growing interest in
using the SIB model to help scale proven solutions to social
problems.121 Nevertheless, a critical question emerges: should the
private sector be responsible for sustaining proven social welfare
programs into the foreseeable future, or should the ongoing
funding of public welfare programs fall under the job description
of government entities funded by taxpayer dollars? If the answer
lies in the latter camp, impact investors who seek the safer risk
profile of proven social welfare programs may in fact hinder the
development of innovative, disruptive SIB programs that can
challenge the systemic social and economic inequities that plague
our country.122
D. The Ethics of Social Impact Bonds
As we explore the implications of privatizing the delivery of
some public services through the SIB model, a discussion of the
role of government in the provision of social welfare services is
useful. After the financial crisis of 2008, governments across the
globe expressed increased interest in outsourcing the funding and
delivery of critical social services.123 However, support for
outsourcing public services to the private sector is mixed. A
longstanding challenge facing social justice advocates has been
identifying how to finance innovation in public welfare service
125−26 (Kevin Farnsworth et al. eds. 2014) (“Assessing performance in relation to outcomes
rather than narrower indicators does not resolve this problem nor address the incentive to
game playing—focusing on meeting formal performance targets rather than substantive
issues—and shaping services to meet the terms of a contract rather than the needs of
clients. SIBs could encourage investors to focus on policy areas that have more readily
measurable results . . . and encourage a focus on the ‘low hanging fruit.’” (citation omitted)).
120. See id. at 123 (“SIBs allow governments ‘to privatize the up-front costs of social
innovations and the associated risks, thus reducing taxpayer expenditures in the shortterm and eliminating the risk of government money being spent on interventions which do
not deliver the desired outcomes.’” (citation omitted)).
121. See Emily Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 24–32.
122. Arguably, the SIB is not designed to be a “safe” investment for impact investors.
Both the Peterborough SIB and the Rikers Island SIB offered their investors the least
attractive features of both debt and equity investments, notwithstanding efforts to mitigate
investment risk through creative contract negotiation. See Burand, supra note 26, at
459−60.
123. For example, the U.K. Cabinet Office’s Green Paper, Modernising Commission,
reaffirmed the government’s commitment to pay-for-success programming. This in turn
inspired the creation of the Centre for Social Impact Bonds and the establishment of a £20
million Social Outcomes Fund. See Sinclair et al., supra note 119, at 119.
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delivery, while coming to consensus on the underlying public
policy values that guide their development and implementation.124
On the one hand, there is a prevailing assumption embedded in
the SIB model that private sector stakeholders can more
effectively coordinate and manage social welfare services than
cash-strapped and legislatively constrained governmental actors.
On the other hand, this viewpoint undermines the complex nature
of public services, which are concerned with more than simply
quantitative assessments and instrumental programmatic goals.
Indeed, public services also reflect “statements about ideals of
citizenship, fraternity and solidarity, which mark the social fabric
of a society.”125
Critical scholars have recently begun to explore how the SIB
model raises ethical and moral concerns for democratic
governments.126 Employing a Kantian deontological system of
ethics, where actions are viewed as being morally impermissible if
they do not treat persons with “respect,”127 one may question
whether it is in fact wrong for someone to profit directly from the
human suffering of another individual, particularly in a way that
undermines the autonomy of the program participants.128 SIB
124. See id. at 127 (“Social Impact Bonds raise the question of what qualifies as a
‘public’ or ‘private’ welfare service, and indeed whether this distinction is anything other
than a technicality.”).
125. See id. at 129.
126. See generally Emma Dowling, In the Wake of Austerity: Social Impact Bonds and
the Financialization of the Welfare State in Britain, 22 NEW POLITICAL ECON. 294, 297−98
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2017.1232709 [https://perma.cc/B5UP-J7QH];
Emma Dowling & David Harvie, Harnessing the Social: State, Crisis and (Big) Society, 48
SOCIOLOGY 869 (2014) (explaining that government social investment market policies
aimed at resolving a global crisis in ways that empower local communities actually foster
further financialization and a deepening of capitalist disciplinary logics into the social
fabric); Sinclair et al., supra note 119; Neil McHugh et al., Social Impact Bonds: A Wolf in
Sheep’s Clothing?, 21 J. OF POVERTY & SOC. JUST. 247, 250–51 (2013) (investigating the
moral question about what role the market should play in society in relation to social
problems); Alex Nicholls & Alex Murdock, The Nature of Social Innovation, in SOCIAL
INNOVATION: BLURRING BOUNDARIES TO RECONFIGURE MARKETS 1 (Alex Nicholls & Alex
Murdock, eds., 2012) (discussing social innovation broadly conceived in the context of social
entrepreneurship and social enterprise in their global context).
127. See Julia Morley, The Ethical Status of Social Impact Bonds 12−13 (unpublished
manuscript), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56573087e4b0f60cdba13509/t/58eb6db
b5016e13683134b58/1491824060500/The-ethics-of-SIBs-submission-April-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AWM4-KZTV] (“Whereas the theory of expected utility requires decisionmakers to be hyper-rational, we can realistically this assumption in practice to say that
agents must have well-informed expectations of the outcomes of their actions. This is
consistent with work by moral philosophers and social theorists who have argued that
certain kinds of activities, such as healthcare, do not lend themselves to marketisation
without the risk of moral problems arising.”).
128. Indeed, the earliest SIB investors of the Peterborough SIB and the Rikers Island
SIB relied upon the existence of prisoners and the involuntary participation in
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advocates have traditionally responded to such concerns by
emphasizing the benefits of the SIB model to social welfare
delivery, justifying the morally questionable profits earned by its
social investors on consequentialist ethical grounds129⎯the means
of social welfare delivery are justified by the measurable benefits
to individuals and society in terms of social welfare or utility.
When viewed through a utility-maximization lens,130 the profit
motive imbedded in the SIB model serves to facilitate efficient
resource allocation, meet consumer needs, and compensate private
stakeholders for the risks associated with their investments.
These utilitarian arguments hinge on the presumption that free
markets can spur economic growth, which ultimately leads to a
higher level of aggregate utility for all.
Conversely, some moral philosophers have criticized
consequentialist theories of ethics, noting that different methods
of carrying out an action often determine the nature of the
outcome. For example, when private-sector stakeholders carry out
public services, the outcomes may be significantly different than
when executed by the government, even if aggregate utility
appears to have increased. American philosopher Debra Satz
provides guidance on identifying the characteristics of ethical or
“moral” markets, as well as the signs of unethical or “noxious”
markets, by observing their distributional effects.131 According to
Satz, an increase in aggregate utility may nevertheless lead to a
morally problematic distribution of welfare when there are
asymmetries in information among decision-makers regarding the
consequences of the transaction or when there is an imbalance of
power between market participants.132 Market participants should
be equipped with information about the likely outcomes of their
actions that can empower them to make utility-maximizing
decisions.133 Further, there should be an equality of power among
rehabilitation programs to make a financial return from their social investments. Id.;
Abram Olmstead, Rikers Island Tackles Rearrest Rate with Social Impact Bond—a U.S.
First, FREE ENTERPRISE (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.freeenterprise.com/rikers-islandtackles-rearrest-rate-countrys-first-social-impact-bond/ [https://perma.cc/MM2K-3MSJ].
129. See Morley, supra note 127, at 9−10.
130. See id. at 10 n.10 (“Those who think that mere aggregation fails to capture every
aspect of moral significance often favour some version of prioritarianism, the view that the
goodness of an outcome depends upon the well-being of all individuals, but where extra
weight is given to those who are worse off.”).
131. DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS
OF MARKETS 92−97 (2010).
132. See id. at 97−98.
133. However, research demonstrates that decision-makers routinely make choices
that are inconsistent with rational choice theory because they are subject to biases, framing
effects, subjective preferences and heuristics. Thus, even with adequate information, it is
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market participants. Whether or not these market conditions are
attainable in the context of social welfare services,134 especially
when those services are financed by SIBs,135 the discussion
suggests that the inherent vulnerability of SIB constituent
populations⎯who are typically uninformed about the financing
details of SIB programs and lack power to make any decisions
related to their participation136⎯may undermine the moral
legitimacy of the SIB marketplace.
By perpetuating the privatization of public services, the
current SIB model may in fact erode the ability of governments to
uphold the values and ideals of democratic citizenship, including
“direct public and democratic accountability for welfare
entitlements.”137 Further, by failing to meaningfully consider the
implications of the current market-based SIB model for the
importance of citizens’ rights in public welfare provision, SIB
advocates may in fact reinforce a neoliberal, pro-business
approach to public service delivery that shifts “the morality of
welfare provision” and “changes the status of the service user from
a citizen entitled to support into a commodity processed for
profit.”138 Consequently, under the current SIB framework, public
service becomes “de-moraliz[ed],” and economic development
becomes decreasingly about delivering a vision of ethical
democratic life grounded in solidarity and more about maximizing
private interests to advance collective benefit.139
Satz also notes that moral markets have two key outcomes:
(1) no harm is done to individuals and (2) no harm is done to society
uncertain whether actors will make utility-maximizing decisions. See generally Herbert A.
Simon, Rationality as a Process and as Product of Thought, in DECISION MAKING:
DESCRIPTIVE, NORMATIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE INTERACTIONS 58, 60−61, 66–68 (David E. Bell
et al. eds., 1988).
134. See Morley, supra note 127, at 12−13 (“Whereas the standard theory of expected
utility requires decision-makers to be hyper-rational, we can realistically relax this
assumption in practice to say that agents must have well-informed expectations of the
likely outcomes of their actions. This is consistent with work by moral philosophers and
social welfare theorists who have argued that certain kinds of activities, such as healthcare,
do not lend themselves to marketisation without the risk of moral problems arising.”).
135. See id. at 15 (noting that a cost-benefit analysis of the current SIB model may
lead advocates to question “whether the spillover of knowledge from the private sector to
the social sector, or the transfer of risk from the public sector to the private sector, can be
achieved in some other way”).
136. See id. at 13, 19 (“Markets characterized by ‘very weak or highly asymmetric
knowledge and agency’ of participants are likely to be noxious,” and “[a] crucial piece of
information that may not be made clear to the individuals who are intervened upon by the
SIB is that they are effectively a profit-centre for private investors.” (citations omitted)).
137. See Sinclair et al., supra note 119, at 129.
138. See id. at 131.
139. See id at 131−32.
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overall.140 Regarding the first outcome, while on its face the SIB
seems to offer great benefits to its constituent populations, the
embedded profit motive that drives, at least in part, the decisionmaking of impact investors may in fact reinforce short-term,
incremental solutions, while deprioritizing opportunities for more
meaningful systems change. Leading philanthropists have already
noted the dangers of investing without an intentional focus on
systemic change.141 Furthermore, the pervasive neoliberal,
market-based approach to economic development may hinder the
adoption of alternative economic frameworks that seek to shift
development programs away from capitalism and toward more
communitarian economic models that can more effectively
advance economic justice.142 Simply put, private investors may be
less inclined to radically shift an economic system that serves as
the foundation of their profit model because they would be acting
against the best interests of the company143⎯long understood by
economists to be the maximization of shareholder wealth.144
Regarding Satz’s second outcome of moral markets, it is
unclear whether the SIB model may harm society overall. The
design of the early criminal justice SIBs, for example, implies that
the motivation for investing in the rehabilitation of incarcerated
individuals need not be the achievement of broad-based
democratic engagement or community, social, and economic
empowerment, but can simply be the prospect of private profit for
140. See SATZ, supra note 131, at 94−95.
141. See Walker, supra note 2 (arguing that “giving back is necessary, but not
sufficient. We should seek to bring about lasting, systemic change, even if that change
might adversely affect us. We must bend each act of generosity toward justice”).
142. For example, the “social and solidarity economy” has been declared a promising
new approach to economic life that is participatory, inclusive and grounded in a concern for
community empowerment. See UTTING, supra note 31, at 6 (“This umbrella term is
increasingly used to refer to forms of economic activity that prioritize social and often
environmental objectives, and involve producers, workers, consumers and citizens acting
collectively and in solidarity. The broadening field of SSE involves not only traditional
‘social economy’ or ‘third sector’ organizations and enterprises such as cooperatives, mutual
associations, grant-dependent and service-delivery non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and community and other forms of volunteering and giving, but also myriad types
of self-help groups organizing to produce goods and services, fair trade networks and other
forms of solidarity purchasing, consumer groups involved in collective provisioning,
associations of ‘informal economy’ workers, new forms of profit-making social enterprises
and social entrepreneurs, and NGOs that are having to shift from a dependence on
donations and grants to sustaining themselves via income-generating activities.”).
143. See Morley, supra note 127, at 23−24 (“This is because profit-seeking
organisations will inevitably focus on improving the existing system—a system that is
consistent with their own long-term success—rather than making fundamental changes
that may conflict with their desire to maintain the status quo.”).
144. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS, 22−23 (Univ.
of Chi. Press ed., 1953).
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savvy social investors. The integration of financial incentives for
the private sector into the delivery of public services⎯a
marketization of social welfare service delivery⎯runs the risk of
undermining the moral and ethical value of governmental,
nonprofit, and philanthropic organizations dedicated to civic
missions.145 Taken to its logical conclusion, what happens to the
much-needed SIB program that is unable to turn a financial profit
for impact investors? Is it simply abandoned as a failure, even if it
makes an impact that is difficult to quantify in monetary terms?
Further, the work of staff at social service organizations may
suffer if their intrinsic motivation for public service work and
personal identities as public servants are negatively influenced by
an awareness of their role in delivering profits to external financial
stakeholders.146 This, in turn, may compromise the long-term
effectiveness of some social welfare programs.
One might conclude that the purpose of the SIB is not true
innovation at all but merely to perpetuate an increasingly
neoliberal approach to governance. While the SIB model
seemingly strikes a balance between place-based and people-based
economic development strategies by providing resources to
marginalized populations in the communities where they live, it
nevertheless sustains a dogma of free-market fundamentalism
that grew to prominence under President Ronald Reagan;
continued into the Bush, Clinton, and Obama eras; and remains a
salient force in economic life today under the Trump
administration.147 This ideology builds upon a political and
145. See Daniel Edmiston & Alex Nicholls, Social Impact Bonds: The Role of Private
Capital in Outcome-Based Commissioning, 47 J. SOC. POL’Y 57, 72 (2018) (arguing, “the
marketization introduced through private social investment, runs the risk of undermining
‘the distinctive contributions that nonprofit organizations make to creating and
maintaining a strong civil society’ through value-driven services, advocacy, voluntarism,
community-focused social networks and civic participation”) (quoting Angela M. Eikenberry
& Jodie Drapal Kluver, The Marketization of the Nonprofit Sector: Civil Society at Risk?, 64
PUB. ADM. REV. 132, 132–40 (2004)).
146. Julian Le Grand, Knights and Knaves Return: Public Service Motivation and the
Delivery of Public Services, 13 INT’L PUB. MGMT J. 1, 59 (“For those who are motivated to
perform effectively by internal factors, such as their sense of professional duty and their
altruistic concern for the welfare of the people they were serving, the use of external
rewards or penalties at best leads to discouragement and demoralisation, and at worst
actively promotes damaging, self-interested behavior.”).
147. Indeed, during the 1990s, advocates and scholars continued to advocate for
development strategies centered on enabling the private sector to create businesses in
distressed neighborhoods. It was often presumed, couched in stereotype and a disregard for
the impact that structural shifts in a community can have on low-income residents, that
“[g]iven the workforce, low-skill jobs are realistic and economically viable . . . . Over time,
successful job creation will trigger a self-reinforcing process that raises skill and wage
levels.” Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, HARV. BUS. REV.
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economic theory that upholds the belief that human well-being
and social innovation can best be achieved by promoting
entrepreneurial freedom in a libertarian system of limited state
intervention, one that fosters strong private property rights,
intellectual property rights, free markets, individualism, and
personal responsibility.148
Additionally, there may be power dynamics at play that call
into question the ethical dimension of SIBs. Scholars have argued
that our nation’s turn away from the Keynesian fiscal and
monetary policies embodied in President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
Great Society,149 and toward supply-side solutions to the economic
stagflation of the 1970s,150 was driven to some degree by a desire
to restore or “reconstruct” the class power of economic elites that
came under attack during the Civil Rights Movement.151 Under
this bold theory, our market-based approach to economic
development was intentionally designed to establish the necessary
conditions for capital accumulation by the economic elite and not
to address the increasing problem of concentrated wealth and
power among a small segment of our capitalist society.152 If this is
indeed true, then the notion of liberating the market economy to
correct market failures is coded language for turning a blind eye
to poverty and fodder for the emergence of an oligarchical society
committed to the rule of the few. Under this framing of economic
development, neoliberalization offers, as social philosopher Karl
Polanyi argued, a contradictory kind of “freedom for those whose
income, leisure and security need no enhancing, and a mere
pittance of liberty for the people, who may in vain attempt to make
use of their democratic rights to gain shelter from the power of the
owners of property.”153 However, according to Polanyi, the
May–June 1995, at 55, 62.
148. See HARVEY, supra note 36, at 64−65.
149. See generally Robert Higgs, The Economics of the Great Society, INDEP. INST. (Feb.
1, 2011), http://www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=3157 [https://perma.cc/W4U2JSW4] (explaining that Johnson’s Great Society programs included job training, housing,
food stamps, and other forms of assistance that inadvertently helped to define Black
inequality as primarily an economic question).
150. See HARVEY, supra note 36, at 22 (“During the Carter presidency . . . deregulation
of the economy emerged as one of the answers to the chronic state of stagflation that had
prevailed in the US throughout the 1970s.”).
151. See id. at 19 (“We can, therefore, interpret neoliberalization either as a utopian
project to realize a theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or
as a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore
the power of economic elites.”).
152. See id. (explaining that neoliberalism has not been successful in revitalizing
global capital accumulation outside of serving the goal of establishing an economic elite).
153. See id. at 37.
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achievement of a “neoliberal utopianism is doomed” by the evils of
“authoritarianism, or even outright fascism” in certain
instances.154 The rise of President Donald Trump has already
ushered in fears that we may be heading in this direction.155
It is becoming increasingly convincing that a neoliberal
political ideology has led many governments to conceptualize their
role in the praxis of economic development theory as mere
legislators of targeted incentives for private market action, rather
than as public servants committed to the social and economic wellbeing of all citizens.156 This has led to the increased privatization
of public welfare initiatives,157 further evidenced by the evolving
SIB model. Underlying the ecosystem of the emerging SIB model
are the principles and values of a neoliberal political theory that
espouse a pro-business view of economic life—(1) personal and
individual freedom in the marketplace as paramount to a thriving
economy and (2) individual responsibility and personal
accountability as determining factors of social mobility, whether
up or down the ladder of success. SIB programs routinely cast
social problems as personal issues. This, arguably, is necessary to
perpetuate American exceptionalism and sustain notions of an
“American Dream” within a hegemonic global capitalist system,158
all while simultaneously pulling the shades on America’s bitter
legacy of state-sponsored racism and chronic imperialism.
As a result, the SIB seemingly works according to the
neoliberal plan,159 nurturing the vestiges of a cancerous, racially
tainted and economically skewed vision of economic development.
It provides opportunities for capital accumulation and the
concentration of power amongst the economic elite by elevating the
role of private enterprise and entrepreneurial initiative in the
provision of public welfare.160 At the same time, it downplays the
importance of a moral and ethical commitment to advancing
154. Id.
155. See Robin Wright, Madeleine Albright Warns of a New Fascism—and Trump,
NEW YORKER (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/madeleinealbright-warns-of-a-new-fascism-and-trump [https://perma.cc/M2Q5-SHZV].
156. See HARVEY, supra note 36, at 48.
157. See id. at 76.
158. See generally TERRENCE E. PAUPP, THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL RELATIONS 41 (2009);
see also HARVEY, supra note 36, at 50, 65–66.
159. See McFarlane, supra note 33, at 323 (explaining that neoliberal thought “favored
‘facilitating capital mobility and cutting community programs that might distort private
investment decisions’” (quoting Susan E. Clarke & Gary L. Gaile, Local Politics in a Global
Era: Thinking Locally, Acting Globally, 551 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 28, 33
(1997) (emphasis added))).
160. See Harvey, supra note 36, at 47.
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participatory democracy, as well as an authentic commitment to
our nation’s foundational democratic values. Due to its
prioritization of individual accountability and responsibility, the
capitalistic regime and neoliberal orthodoxy that drives the design
of the SIB model has led to the continued creation of individualized
programs to assist marginalized peoples in solving their own
poverty, regardless of the role of the state in sustaining
institutional barriers to social mobility.161 The SIB model
integrates a systemic bias for capitalistic endeavors with limited
state intervention yet allows for special state interventions when
they further business interests and foster increased
financialization by experts and elites.162 This imbalance of power
and perpetuation of wealth disparities bears the marking of Debra
Satz’s unethical, noxious market.
Lastly, the current SIB model fails to incorporate any
meaningful systems of social solidarity or significant restraints on
capital accumulation that would help foster community economic
empowerment and promote economic justice.163 Impact investors
who are committed to advancing economic justice should reflect
upon their various motivations for selecting and funding SIB
programs. If the reduction of financial risks and the maintenance
of profits remain a guiding force for how impact investors select
and design SIB programs, then community economic
empowerment will undoubtedly take a back seat, and true
innovation in poverty alleviation will be a second thought. This
Article argues that impact investors should prioritize the
integration of a moral motivation into the calculus of their
engagement with the SIB model, one grounded in a desire for
social justice. Looking forward, scholars should explore new
economic development frameworks that offer principles to guide
the implementation of the SIB model. An intentionally designed
“justice-based” approach to economic development would not only
lead to more progressive social welfare programs but would also
open the door for new ideas about economic life that can impact
the root causes and structural determinants of poverty in America.

161. Id. at 76 (“As the state withdraws from welfare provision and diminishes its role
. . . it leaves larger and larger segments of the population exposed to impoverishment. The
social safety net is reduced to a bare minimum in favour of a system that emphasizes
personal responsibility.”).
162. Id. at 74 (“This tendency on the part of the core states like the US to protect
financial interests and to stand by as they suck in surpluses from elsewhere both promotes
and reflects the consolidation of upper-class power within those states around processes of
financialization.”).
163. Id. at 75.
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III. SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Initially, social impact bonds were used to fund social welfare
programs targeting challenges in the criminal justice sector,
specifically homing in on the problem of prisoner recidivism.164
This was largely due to the strong alignment between challenges
impacting the criminal justice system and the need for
quantifiable SIB assessment metrics. The criminal justice system
offered monetizable assessment outcomes—the reduction of
recidivism rates could be traced directly to a reduction in public
expenditures.165 Additionally, there has been a high degree of
political interest in reducing the negative collateral consequences
of mass incarceration, especially given its harmful impact on
predominantly black, low-income communities.166
The first SIB was launched in September 2010 in the city of
Peterborough in the United Kingdom.167 By funding the
Peterborough Prison Project (the “Peterborough SIB”), a prisoner
rehabilitation program designed to reduce prisoner recidivism for
short-term male prisoners, the impact investment paved the way
for future criminal justice SIBs around the globe. The first SIB in
the United States, launched by New York City in August 2012 at
the Rikers Island Prison (the “Rikers Island SIB”), was also
designed to reduce young adult recidivism.168
164. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 13 (“The criminal justice system
has clearly defined and monetizable outcomes, and there is high political commitment due
to the large number of negative outcomes and resulting community pressure.”).
165. Peter Walker, Investors to Pay for Prisoner Rehabilitation, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19,
2010), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/mar/19/investors-pay-for-prisonerrehabilitation [https://perma.cc/LF7F-4TQL] (“According to the St Giles Trust, a recent
economic evaluation of its Through the Gates scheme for ex-prisoners reduced re-offending
by 40%, saving the government £10 for every pound invested.”).
166. Centuries of racial oppression in America have impacted the social and economic
development of marginalized, predominantly black communities. Since the Civil Rights
Movement, tremendous progress has been made in advancing social justice for these
marginalized communities. However, an era of targeted criminal justice policies following
the civil rights movement instituted a new form of “Jim Crow,” establishing a law
enforcement system that seemingly prioritized the mass incarceration of black men in
predominantly low-income communities, painting a narrative of American criminality
largely defined by poverty and race. The United States is now one of the highest
incarcerators of its citizens among countries worldwide, and an alarmingly high percentage
of those incarcerated citizens are both low-income and black. See generally MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
6–7 (2010).
167. See Callanan et al., supra note 64, at 19; see Walker, supra note 165 (“The pilot
scheme for the so-called social impact bonds will see investors pay £5m towards intensive
education and support for short-term prisoners leaving Peterborough prison in
Cambridgeshire.”).
168. See Toussaint, supra note 13, at 74; see also Burand, supra note 26, at 457 (“Like
the Peterborough SIB, the New York City SIB is aimed at reducing prisoner recidivism and
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These SIB programs have faced criticism and have yielded
mixed results. After the Peterborough SIB showed early promise,
the UK government ended the intervention earlier than planned
and modified its national approach to probation and rehabilitation
services. In an effort to scale the program’s success, the UK
government decided to provide rehabilitation services for
incarcerated individuals across the UK by using a diverse network
of public service providers and private investors in a fashion
similar to the Peterborough SIB.169 In contrast, the Rikers Island
SIB in New York City was shut down early after failing to meet its
performance benchmarks. Although the Rikers Island SIB was
able to reach nearly 2000 adolescent males during the three years
of its operation, it faced significant challenges navigating the
unique climate of Rikers Island Prison and struggled to validate
its evidence-based intervention with the target population.170
These two examples reveal that the SIB model is still in its early
phases, and best practices are still being defined as new programs
are rolled out.
A. The Peterborough Prison Social Impact Bond
Research on the social impact bond model began in the United
Kingdom in 2007 after the Prime Minister’s Council on Social
Action was asked to explore economic innovations to help finance
social welfare initiatives.171 The UK government began exploring
SIBs as a potential funding platform to spur social change, and by
2010, the government had published a green paper describing
plans to utilize pilot pay-for-success programs to address
shortcomings in the criminal justice system.172 In September 2010,
does so by providing funding to scale preventative social interventions.”).
169. See EMMA DISLEY ET AL., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE PAYMENT BY RESULTS SOCIAL
IMPACT BOND PILOT AT HMP PETERBOROUGH: FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT 1–2
(2015) [hereinafter FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT], https://assets.publishing.servic
e.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/486512/social-impactbond-pilot-peterborough-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2Q6-UBPA] (stating that change to
Peterborough model was driven by reforms to probation).
170. See IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE ADOLESCENT BEHAVIORAL LEARNING
EXPERIENCE (ABLE) PROGRAM AT RIKERS ISLAND, VERA INST. JUSTICE (July 2015),
http://secondowelfare.it/edt/file/adolescent-behavioral-learning-experience-evaluationrikers-island-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/83SA-DP75].
171. See KATE BELL & MATTHEW SMERDON, DEEP VALUE: A LITERATURE REVIEW OF
THE ROLE OF EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS IN PUBLIC SERVICES 72 (2011) (“The Council on
Social Action (CoSA) was an initiative chaired by Prime Minister Gordon Brown between
2007 and 2009. It brought together innovators from every sector to generate ideas and
initiatives through which government and other key stakeholders could catalyse, develop
and celebrate social action.”).
172. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, BREAKING THE CYCLE: EFFECTIVE PUNISHMENT,
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Social Finance UK, a nongovernmental organization that helps
fund social service organizations, led the development of the first
SIB in the UK. As the intermediary constituent in the deal, Social
Finance UK raised £5 million in upfront seed capital from
seventeen private investors and philanthropists.173 The program
was originally designed as a pilot to test the theory that providing
incarcerated individuals with comprehensive and individualized
support would help them not only stay out of prison but also craft
a better life once they returned to their home communities.174
Under the terms of the Peterborough SIB, if the program
succeeded in reducing the rate of recidivism among the target
population (as assessed by an independent third party), the UK
Ministry of Justice, with financial support from the UK Big
Lottery Fund,175 agreed to pay a return to the SIB investors that
included the principal amount invested and a success fee, based
on a capped sliding scale.176 However, if the predetermined
performance targets were not met, the UK government would not
have any payment obligations to the SIB investors.177
The Peterborough SIB utilized the investment capital raised
REHABILITATION AND SENTENCING OF OFFENDERS 71 (2010), https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/185947/greenpaper-evidence-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/53JP-TLKC].
173. The pool of investors included several notable charities and foundations such as
Barrow Cadbury Trust and the Esmee Fairbairn Foundation as well as several “high net
worth” individuals. See Burand, supra note 26, at 454–55 n.12; see also EMMA DISLEY ET
AL., LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PLANNING AND EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SOCIAL IMPACT BOND AT HMP PETERBOROUGH 23 (2011), https://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR1166.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4EJ-KXSJ].
174. Approximately sixty percent of short-term prisoners in the United Kingdom reoffend within one year of their release from prison. See PRISON REFORM TRUST, PRISON:
THE FACTS, BROMLEY BRIEFINGS 14 (2017), http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Portals/
0/Documents/Bromley%20Briefings/Summer%202017%20factfile.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4
KW-SAJP].
175. See FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 169, at 3.
176. Under the Peterborough SIB, the investors would be paid in years four, six, and
eight of the program, based upon the performance of the One Service intervention. SOC.
FIN., A NEW TOOL FOR SCALING IMPACT: HOW SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS CAN MOBILIZE
PRIVATE CAPITAL TO ADVANCE SOCIAL GOOD 9 (2012), https://www.socialfinance.org.uk/sit
es/default/files/publications/small.socialfinancewpsinglefinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A6PVVAF] [hereinafter A NEW TOOL]. The value of the outcome payments was expected to
generate an annual rate of return between 2.5% and 13%. Id. at 40.
177. The Peterborough SIB guaranteed repayment to investors if the program
achieved at least a 7.5% reduction in the frequency of reconviction events across all 3,000
male prisoners in the target group, or a 10% reduction for each cohort, as compared to a
control group of other short-term male prisoners. While measuring the frequency of
reconviction events (as opposed to a binary calculation of whether a reconviction event
occurs) was believed to better correlate with the costs associated with recidivism, it also
posed a risk of statistical sampling errors in measuring performance outcomes, especially
considering the small number of prisoners in the Peterborough SIB cohorts. See id. at 9.
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by Social Finance UK to fund a seven-year prisoner rehabilitation
program that provided three cohorts of 1000 short-term male
prisoners at Her Majesty’s Prison Peterborough with “throughthe-gate” transition services for up to twelve months during and
after their release from prison.178 Specifically, Social Finance UK
coordinated the creation of a nonprofit organization called “One
Service,” which facilitated a voluntary prisoner rehabilitation
program comprised of a network of nonprofit organizations
throughout the UK.179 These social service providers worked oneon-one with the incarcerated individuals, providing them with
housing, education, vocational training, and healthcare services as
they transitioned out of prison.180 The flexibility of the
Peterborough SIB funding, coupled with the local management
and operations of the One Service program, enabled the
Peterborough SIB partners to create an adaptive service offering
that responded to the needs of returning citizens in the UK.181
Additionally, the long-term nature of the One Service program
increased engagement between the nonprofit service providers
and the target population.182
The first phase of the One Service program did not reach the
necessary performance benchmark—a 10% reduction in
recidivism for each cohort and a 7.5% reduction across all

178. See FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 169, at 11, 13.
179. See id. at 11–12.
180. Nonprofit service providers contracted by One Service included the St. Giles
Trust, Ormiston Families Trust, John Laing Training, Mind, the YMCA, and Supporting
Others through Volunteer Action (SOVA). See FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT, supra
note 169, at 26. The program was not prescribed as a part of release conditions for prisoners,
and prisoners could choose whether or not to engage with the service. This required case
workers to find mechanisms for cohort engagement and to build meaningful relationships.
See id. at 9, 42–48; see Callanan et al., supra note 64, at 20.
181. Some of the returning citizens received housing, mental health and addiction
support, and training for employment opportunities. See FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION
REPORT, supra note 169, at 30, 43, 48. As one returning citizen in the program explained,
“[t]he One Service has helped me with a training course, housing needs, food, electricity
and someone has always been on the end of the phone even if it’s just someone to talk to . . . .
If it hadn’t have been for this I would be back in prison by now.” See Press Release, Soc.
Fin., Peterborough Social Impact Bond Reduces Reoffending by 8.4%; Investors on Course
for Payment in 2016 (Aug. 7, 2014), https://assets.rockefellerfoundation.org/app/uploads/
20150316202925/Peterborough-Social-Impact-Bond-Reduces-Reoffending-by-8.4percent.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX64-L6LU] [hereinafter Press Release].
182. David Robinson, chair of the Peterborough SIB Advisory Board, stated, “[t]he
project was deliberately set up to be a long-term project so that we can learn, improve and
refine the best ways of supporting prisoners on release.” See Andrew Holt, Results Show
Peterborough Social Bond Demonstrate a Reduction in Reconvictions, CHARITY TIMES (July
8, 2014), http://www.charitytimes.com/ct/Results_Peterborough_Social_%20Bond_demonst
rate_reduction_in_reconvictions.php [https://perma.cc/GU9Y-JTMH].
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cohorts—to trigger early repayments for private investors.183
Nevertheless, by August 2014, Social Finance UK announced that
the Peterborough SIB had successfully reduced reoffending in the
first cohort of 1000 prisoners by 8.4%, as compared to the national
baseline, and was on track to disperse investor outcome payments
by the year 2016.184
Prompted by the early success of the Peterborough SIB
program, the UK Ministry of Justice launched a program toward
the end of 2014 called Transforming Rehabilitation.185 Funded by
the UK government, the program was designed to provide
rehabilitation services for incarcerated individuals across the UK
using a diverse network of public service providers and private
investors in a fashion similar to the SIB funded One Service
program.186 Beginning in February 2015, Transforming
Rehabilitation created the framework for the development of
twenty-one Community Rehabilitation Companies (“CRC”) to help
supervise the reentry of short-term prisoners across the UK.187
Each CRC represents a diverse mix of public, private, and
voluntary stakeholders who work collaboratively to provide
critical social services to returning citizens.188 Transforming
Rehabilitation has embraced the SIB model with the new CRCs as
the service providers are only paid in full if they are successful in
reducing recidivism based upon predetermined performance
183. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PETERBOROUGH SOCIAL IMPACT BOND HMP
DONCASTER 2 (2014),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/341682/pbr-pilots-cohort-1-results.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8LJ-GW9L].
184. See Brinda Ganguly, The Success of the Peterborough Social Impact Bond,
ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/successpeterborough-social-impact/ [https://perma.cc/GWM9-2TEG]. David Hutchison, CEO of
Social Finance, noted, “[t]he SIB has given our delivery partners the resources and the
freedom to meet the complex needs of our prison leavers very effectively.” See Press Release,
supra note 181.
185. Ganguly, supra note 184.
186. Id.
187. See generally MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, TRANSFORMING REHABILITATION: A
STRATEGY FOR REFORM (2013), https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/
transforming-rehabilitation/results/transforming-rehabilitation-response.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2N4B-XAL2].
188. Almost 1,000 organizations, with 700 listed as voluntary, community or social
enterprise, have joined the movement to develop new innovations in reducing recidivism
and enhancing opportunities for returning citizens. Under the new system, each CRC is
responsible for crafting a plan for each offender’s rehabilitation as soon as they enter prison,
and the same organization is responsible for supporting them during their time in prison
and helping them reintegrate into their home communities after their release. See Press
Release, Ministry of Justice, Charities in Front Seat of New Reoffending Drive (Dec. 18,
2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/charities-in-front-seat-of-new-reoffendingdrive [https://perma.cc/NMT7-VVKB].
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metrics. The Ministry of Justice announced a curtailment of the
Peterborough SIB in June 2015 to avoid any duplication of services
being provided to the target population by Transforming
Rehabilitation.189
B. The Rikers Island Prison Social Impact Bond
Modeled after the Peterborough SIB in the UK, the Rikers
Island SIB in New York was the first social impact bond launched
in the United States.190 In August 2012, then New York City
Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg announced that investment bank
Goldman Sachs had agreed to invest $9.6 million to finance a
prisoner rehabilitation program targeting 3000 mostly low-income
adolescent males, sixteen to eighteen years of age, at the Rikers
Island Correctional Facility.191 Coordinated by MDRC, a nonprofit
service provider serving as the SIB intermediary (paid by
Bloomberg Philanthropies for serving in that capacity), the Rikers
Island SIB aimed to achieve at least a 10% reduction in the rate of
recidivism among young adult males leaving Rikers Island.192
The Riker’s Island SIB provided the investment capital to
finance a social service program called Adolescent Behavioral
Learning Experience (“ABLE”), which was a part of Mayor
Bloomberg’s comprehensive New York City Young Men’s Initiative
that sought to address disparities between young African
American and Hispanic males in New York City and their nonminority peers.193 MDRC contracted with two nonprofit
189. See Alice Sharman, Peterborough SIB Did Not Foster Innovation, Evaluation
Finds, CIV. SOC’Y MEDIA (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.civilsociety.co.uk/news/peterboroughsib-did-not-foster-innovation--evaluation-finds.html [https://perma.cc/FK5G-F2ZM]; See
FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 169, at 52 (“Although the SIB pilot in
Peterborough was originally intended to operate until 2017, it only operated on a payment
by results basis for the first two cohorts of released prisoners, while the third cohort of
prisoners received support under a fee-for-service arrangement.”).
190. See Toussaint, supra note 13, at 74.
191. See Press Release, N.Y.C. Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg, Deputy Mayor
Gibbs and Corr. Comm’r Schriro Announce Nation’s First Social Impact Bond Program
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/285-12/mayor-bloombergdeputy-mayor-gibbs-corrections-commissioner-schriro-nation-s-first#/0
[https://perma.cc/TXN8-K4E3].
192. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 4.
193. The cross-agency enterprise instituted broad policy changes and agency reforms
that, over the course of three years, planned to invest more than $127 million into programs
connecting young African American and Hispanic males in New York City to educational,
employment, and mentoring opportunities. Notably, the initiative planned to overhaul the
Department of Probation by connecting probationers to economic and educational
opportunities, strengthen educational support, and target the achievement gap by
providing mentoring, literacy, and college and career readiness services. Additionally, the
initiative sought to target the wealth gap by connecting young men to employment
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organizations to facilitate the ABLE Program, which planned to
break the cycle of re-incarceration using an evidence-based
cognitive behavioral therapy intervention called Moral Reconation
Therapy (“MRT”).194 Delivered through the jail’s onsite school, the
facilitators of the ABLE program sought to engage detained youth
and help them transition to life outside of prison by helping them
develop critical social and decision-making skills, while also
teaching them principles of personal responsibility to help them
avoid “unwise” future decisions.195
Unlike the Peterborough SIB, only one impact investor
supported the Rikers Island SIB, global investment bank Goldman
Sachs.196 Additionally, the investment was to be made in the form
of a multiple-disbursing loan, a staggered and conditional
disbursement schedule that would permit Goldman Sachs to stop
making loan disbursements if interim program targets were not
met.197 Under the SIB contract, Goldman Sachs stood to earn a
return on their investment of as much as $2.12 million in
profitswith outcome payments structured on a capped sliding
scale.198 Upon the successful completion of the rehabilitation
program, Goldman Sachs would be repaid by the New York City
Department of Correction, which served as the outcome payer for
the SIB. The outcome payment would be based upon the city’s cost
savings after gaining the ability to close a section of Rikers Island
Correctional Facility due to reduced incarceration rates.199
opportunities. Discussing the New York City Young Men’s Initiative, Mayor Michael R.
Bloomberg stated, “[w]hen we look at poverty rates, graduation rates, crime rates, and
employment rates, one thing stands out: Blacks and Latinos are not fully sharing in the
promise of American freedom and far too many are trapped in circumstances that are
difficult to escape.” See Jennifer Epstein, Bloomberg’s Own $30M for Program, POLITICO
(Aug. 4, 2011), https://www.politico.com/story/2011/08/bloombergs-own-30m-for-program060654 [https://perma.cc/Q4DB-9H2Y].
194. The ABLE program, which was administered by the Osborne Association and
Friends of Island Academy, engaged with 87% of the adolescents that entered Rikers Island
Prison in 2013. Program participants were provided with education, job training, and
counseling. See Jim Parsons et al., Impact Evaluation of the Adolescent Behavioral
Learning Experience (ABLE) Program, VERA INST. JUSTICE 5, 7, 14 (Sept. 2016),
https://www.vera.org/publications/rikers-adolescent-behavioral-learning-experienceevaluation [https://perma.cc/X8J9-JZV4].
195. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 5.
196. See Toussaint, supra note 13, at 74–75.
197. See Godeke & Resner, supra note 43, at 22.
198. The outcome payment ranged from $4.8 million for a two-year recidivism
reduction rate of at least 8.5% to $11.7 million for a two-year recidivism reduction rate of
at least 20%. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 5.
199. The government’s cost savings, which would always exceed private investor
returns and were projected beyond the length of the SIB deal, were predicted based upon
the program serving approximately 3000 participants each year. The success payments
were to be prorated if the program was unable to serve the projected number of participants.
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However, if the rate of reincarceration events was not reduced by
at least 10% from its historical rate, no payment obligations would
be triggered under the SIB. Interestingly, even if the ABLE
program was deemed unsuccessful, Goldman Sachs would only
lose up to $2.4 million of its $9.6 million investment, due to a
partial payment under the capped sliding scale and a loan
guarantee provided by Bloomberg Philanthropies.200
The Vera Institute of Justice (“Vera”), which served as the
independent evaluator for the Rikers Island SIB, was paid by the
Mayor’s Fund to Advance NYC to evaluate the success of the
ABLE program. Vera conducted its performance assessment of the
ABLE program by comparing the selected study group with a
matched historical group of men previously jailed prior to the
program’s establishment.201 In August of 2015, after evaluating
the first year of program delivery, Vera concluded that the
program was failing to meet its recidivism goals, and the ABLE
program at Rikers Island was discontinued.202
Although the ABLE program was able to reach nearly 2000
adolescent males during the three years of its operation, it faced
significant challenges throughout its lifespan. For example, only
9% of the target population completed all 12 stages of the program,
See Berlin, supra note 77, at 7; see also David Chen, Goldman to Invest in City Jail Program,
Profiting if Recidivism Falls Sharply, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/08/02/nyregion/goldman-to-invest-in-new-york-city-jail-program.html [https://perma.
cc/7BU9-RZ7N].
200. Unlike the Peterborough SIB, the impact investor in the Rikers Island SIB,
Goldman Sachs, secured a credit enhancement in the form of a $7.2 million rolling loan
guarantee from Bloomberg Philanthropies. At the end of the ABLE program, if performance
targets were missed, MDRC would not be required to pay back anything to Goldman Sachs
beyond the guaranteed funds. If the program was successfully completed, and there were
leftover guarantee funds, MDRC could retain the funds to support future SIBs. This rolling
guarantee structure provided an incentive for MDRC as the intermediary to ensure that
the SIBs performance targets were met, so that leftover guarantee funds could be used to
finance future projects. See Burand, supra note 26, at 458–59; see also V. Kasturi Rangan
& Lisa Chase, The Payoff of Pay-for-Success, 4 STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 28, 32–33
(2015).
201. Vera was forced to use a quasi-experimental approach in its evaluation, rather
than employing a “randomized control trial” method, because adolescents at Riker’s Island
Prison are moved frequently between different housing units which would have interfered
with coordinating separate treatment and control groups. Vera tracked “recidivism bed
days” (RBDs) which captures the number of days that a member of the study group was
held in jail during the 12 months following their release from prison. In addition to tracking
RBDs for the study group and comparing it to a matched historical group, Vera also tracked
RBDs for 19-year-olds during the same period because rates of recidivism fluctuate over
time, and group changes may be the result of factors that are unrelated to the program,
such as citywide changes in crime rates or policing. See Parsons, supra note 194, at 8–11.
202. The deal had included an option for the partners to end the program early with
the city paying nothing to the investor if it failed to reduce recidivism by at least 9% in the
first year. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 5.
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largely due to the instability of the adolescent’s length of time in
prison and the periodic cancellation of scheduled program
activities.203 Additionally, a high level of stress among adolescent
inmates and a culture of gang violence and intimidation at Rikers
Island often conflicted with the primary goals of MRT and the
benefits of group therapy.204
Although the Rikers Island SIB was deemed unsuccessful,
advocates of the SIB model have highlighted the valuable lessons
learned from the program that hold promise for the future of the
SIB model in the United States. Alongside saving the government
from using limited taxpayer dollars to fund an ineffective social
service program, both the government and the nonprofit service
providers gained support to explore new innovations in criminal
justice reform.205 The New York City Department of Correction
and the City’s Office of Management and Budget had limited
discretionary funding to finance the MRT program at Rikers
Island, and it was unclear at the outset whether cognitive
behavioral therapy would work for adolescents in such a prison
setting.206 The Rikers Island SIB provided the necessary risk
capital for New York City to explore this innovation and determine
its viability. Goldman Sachs has continued to invest in the SIB
marketplace, demonstrating a continued commitment to the SIB
model among impact investors.207
IV. THE OPPORTUNITIES OF SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS
Advocates of the SIB model have highlighted several
opportunities that emerge from its use in the social impact space,
premised on its unique design and market-based funding
structure.208 First, SIBs promote the expansion of investment
capital toward traditionally underfunded social welfare programs
203. The adolescents experienced security-related events at Riker’s Island Prison on a
daily basis, such as lockdowns and alarms that often interfered with MRT sessions. See id.
at 6.
204. Although ABLE also offered MRT in various locations in the community where
adolescents leaving Rikers Island Prison were returning, few of the adolescents attended
due to competing activities like school or court-mandated meetings. See id.
205. See Jones, supra note 20, at 361 (noting “because SIBs require data, metrics, and
benchmarks, nonprofit service providers and government can gain insight from data and
use it more effectively; this result is not available in a traditional social service model where
data is collected after the fact, tracking the amount of service provided or the number of
beneficiaries receiving the service”).
206. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 7.
207. See Jones, supra note 20, at 361.
208. See Caroline Preston, Getting Back More Than a Warm Feeling, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
8, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/giving/investors-profit-by-giving-throughsocial-impact-bonds.html [https://perma.cc/3MWU-A3D5].
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addressing critical social issues, especially important during an
era of governmental fiscal austerity and decreased funding for
social welfare initiatives. Secondly, the SIB model shifts the
investment risk of funding social welfare programs to the private
sector, which not only stands to reduce public spending on risky
initiatives but also can increase the efficient management of public
funds. Lastly, the SIB model shifts government contracts away
from a commonly reactionary approach to social service provision
toward evidence-based, preventative social welfare programs,
which can lead to long-term government cost savings and
meaningful social impact in marginalized, underserved
communities. The sections below discuss each of these
opportunities in turn.
A. Expanding Investment Capital for Social Innovation
One of the opportunities of the SIB is its ability to funnel
additional capital toward traditionally underfunded social welfare
programs,209 especially important during an era of fiscal austerity
at the federal, state, and local government levels.210 The
government has historically utilized strategic partnerships with
private institutions to help finance large-scale public
infrastructure projects.211 Governments have recently taken an
interest in leveraging these same public-private partnerships to
help meet the funding gap for the delivery of social welfare
programs, targeting a wide range of social issues from education
to poverty, the environment, and public health. The private and
philanthropic sectors have also demonstrated an interest in

209. See Eva Coruzzi Schneider, Note, Disparate Impact Lacks an Impact: The Need
for Pay for Success Programs to House Formerly Incarcerated People, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.
J. 529, 570 (2017) (noting that “the PFS model expands access to a market previously
unavailable to nonprofits”).
210. See UTTING, supra note 31, at 8–9 (“The capacities of welfare states have been
undermined by market forces, neoliberal ideology and fiscal constraints, particularly in
contexts of regressive taxation, structural adjustment in developing countries and austerity
policies associated with the fallout from financial crises in parts of the global North.”); See
Peter Gosselin, Here’s How You Add 2.4 Million Jobs to the Economy, BLOOMBERG (May 28,
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-28/government-austerity-exactstoll-on-u-s-jobs-wages-and-growth [https://perma.cc/VP3P-8HEK] (“The nation’s retreat
from tax cuts and spending increases to promote the recovery has been a bipartisan affair.
Democratic President Barack Obama and Republican House Speaker John Boehner agreed
in 2011 to apply the fiscal brakes by negotiating $1 trillion in spending cutbacks over 10
years and a process to impose more.”).
211. For example, governments have used public-private partnerships to finance toll
roads, airports, and even energy generation facilities. See Government Support in
Financing PPPs, WBG (Sept. 8, 2016), https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-privatepartnership/financing/government-support-subsidies [https://perma.cc/29C6-43FM].
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addressing these social challenges, which has resulted in a
growing market for social impact investments. These impact
investments are “intended to create positive impact beyond the
financial return” for socially-minded investors.212 The SIB
provides a unique platform for the convergence of these interested
stakeholders around structured social welfare programs that
target critical social issues.213
Despite the SIB model’s growing popularity, advocates hold
varying opinions on how SIBs should be used to help expand
investment capital for social innovation, largely based upon
different views of the preferred risk profile for SIB projects. As
noted earlier in this Article,214 some advocates believe that SIBs
should focus on providing low-risk investment capital for proven
social welfare programs. This strategy will not only help to reduce
the financial risk for impact investors but also potentially reduce
public spending on expensive remedial programs. Other critics
suggest that SIBs should solely focus on identifying and scaling
innovative, unproven ideas that are too risky for the government
to explore and would otherwise go underfunded or untested. These
preventative social welfare programs may yield long-term
governmental cost savings for the communities they serve and
offer more meaningful resources for their constituents.
Driven by impact investors who seek to maximize social
impact while minimizing financial risk, the design of the current
SIB model will likely lead local and state governments to prioritize
institutional social service providers who offer low-risk, proven
social welfare programs. Unfortunately, this may come at the
expense of riskier innovations or may undermine smaller,
community-based service organizations that are well positioned to
leverage local assets. Notwithstanding, due to a lack of data on the
effectiveness of many large-scale social welfare programs, it will
212. O’DONOHOE ET AL., supra note 26, at 5. A 2015 survey of 158 investors revealed
that the global impact investing market committed more than $15 billion to impact
investments in 2015 and plan to increase capital committed by 16% in 2016. See ABHILASH
MUDALIAR ET AL., J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., 2016 ANNUAL IMPACT INVESTOR SURVEY,
GLOB. IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK 5 (2016), https://thegiin.org/assets/2016%20GIIN%20
Annual%20Impact%20Investor%20Survey_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/29GH-ZZPQ ]. While
the market shows continued growth, it represents a small portion of total assets under
management worldwide, which is expected to exceed $100 trillion by 2020. See MICHAEL
LIERSCH, BANK OF AM. MERRILL LYNCH, MILLENNIALS AND MONEY 12 (2013), http://files.
webydo.com/15/156383/UploadedFiles/f37e3c56-3213-49fd-a201-df7b9e596f35.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YKG2-NFVX].
213. See Gustafsson-Wright et. al., supra note 21, at 2 (“[I]mpact bonds can focus on
the delivery of human services as opposed to the traditional physical infrastructure that
has often been the center of both public-private partnerships and performance contracts.”).
214. See supra Section II.C.
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remain difficult in the short-term for impact investors to easily
identify proven programs that should be expanded or sustained.215
Further, even if investors are able to identify proven, low-risk
social welfare programs that stand to benefit from increased
funding, it is unclear whether the administration of such programs
should remain the primary role of the government.216 Indeed, the
precedent set by the UK government with the Peterborough Prison
SIB is compelling. After the One Service program at the
Peterborough Prison was deemed successful at reducing prisoner
recidivism, it was retooled into a broader government-funded
initiative.217 The UK government not only reclaimed control over
the administration of the rehabilitation program but also
simultaneously opened the door for impact investors to fund new
SIBs exploring other innovative solutions to pressing social
challenges.218
Impact investors who take an interest in the SIB model will
likely vary in both the profile of their risk appetite and the size of
their capital contributions to SIB contracts. While some investors
will seek to maximize the achievement of social justice, other
investors may prioritize a financial return on their investment at
the expense of achieving all the stated social goals of SIB funded
social welfare programs. This is to be expected, as the current SIB
model is designed as an alternative approach to advancing social
good within our current global capitalist system, a system built
upon the maximization of private profit as a foundational
principle. These conflicting values not only complicate the capital
structure of SIB deals, they may ultimately hinder the success of
some SIB projects, making the government stakeholder a critical
player in advocating for the underlying civic mission of every
program.219 This Article urges SIB advocates to explore the
development of a more progressive justice-based CED framework
that can help shift the priorities of impact investors toward more
democratic, “moral” motives that will help advance economic
justice.

215. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 20–21.
216. See supra Section II.D.
217. See generally MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 187, at 8.
218. Id.
219. See Edmiston & Nicholls, supra note 145, at 5 (“[T]he syndicate of social investors
within any given SIB are likely to have different (and potentially conflicting) motivations,
which can lend itself to a layered capital structure.”).
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B. Transferring Investment Risk to the Private Sector
Traditionally, government contracts for social welfare
services are premised on the achievement of programmatic
outputs rather than performance outcomes.220 Additionally,
financial risks are typically shared by both the contracting
government entity and the contractors providing the social
service.221 In some instances, contractors assume most of the
financial risks in the transaction by agreeing upfront to secure
capital from investors to fulfill their contractual obligations. These
contractors often only receive payment from the contracting
government entity after their predetermined programmatic
outputs have been achieved. In other instances, the contracting
government entity bears most of the financial risks by agreeing
upfront to provide a fixed payment to the contractor, coupled with
additional “success fees” if the predetermined programmatic
outputs have been met. Thus, the investment risks of social
welfare delivery typically lie in the hands of service providers or
government stakeholders.
The SIB model shifts the traditional government contracting
paradigm by placing private investors into the middle of the
government-contractor relationship. Impact investments become
the source of upfront working capital for contractors, and
governments are required to repay private investors only after
predetermined, quantifiable performance outcomes have been
achieved. This shift in investment risk provides an opportunity to
reduce public spending on risky social service initiatives, which
scholars have argued may increase the efficient usage of public
funds, as well as reinforce the importance of social innovation.222
Nevertheless, scholars have also noted that the financial risks
imposed on SIB investors under the conventional SIB model may
limit the pool of impact investors because of the underlying
capitalist values that are embedded in the model’s market-based
design.223 SIB advocates have sought to incorporate a number of
financial risk-mitigation and risk-sharing tools into SIB deals,
such as credit enhancements and loan guarantees, in an effort to

220. See Leventhal, supra note 30, at 528.
221. See supra Section IV.B.
222. See Burand, supra note 26, at 467.
223. See id. at 478. But see id. (noting that as SIBs evolve, “other financial
risk-mitigation and risk-sharing tools, such as credit enhancements that provide external
collateral or support senior investment tranches in the capital structure of the SIB could
be incorporated into the SIB structure”).
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cater to investors profit-seeking motivations.224 As the SIB
marketplace continues to evolve, creative risk-sharing
strategies225 or alternative investment schemes226 may help to
further expand the pool of SIB investors. Notwithstanding the
diversity of efforts to address tangible market concerns, this
Article argues that the pool of impact investors interested in the
SIB marketplace will likely not dramatically increase until their
funding motivations shift away from profit maximization toward
social and economic justice.
Additionally, due to their market-based design, SIBs that
seek to shift the investment risk of social welfare programs to the
private sector may in fact hinder innovation in service delivery. As
private stakeholders take a more active role in the delivery of
public services, more oversight and accountability are to be
expected. However, the introduction of additional systems of
performance measurement and program management can lead
social service providers to shift their focus from flexible service
delivery to efficient outcome achievement.227 As a result, social
service providers may engage in less experimentation during
service delivery and instead focus more attention on innovations
that reduce short-term costs rather than improve service quality
or program effectiveness.228 In some instances, the SIB model may
even run the risk of promoting dysfunctional or unethical practices
by certain social service providers where such behavior can lead to
more effective outcome achievement.229 In short, the
marketization of public services may lead to unethical decisionmaking. This Article calls for a shift in the framing of the SIB
model that can lead impact investors to rethink their funding
224. For example, see the risk mitigation strategies used in the Rikers Island SIB,
supra Section III.B.
225. See A NEW TOOL, supra note 176, at 15, 22 (discussing the potential impact of
creative risk-sharing innovations to the growth of the SIB marketplace).
226. For example, the concept of a “micro” SIB could facilitate smaller investments.
See EAN GARRETT ET AL., THE MICRO SOCIAL IMPACT BOND: A FRAMEWORK FOR 21ST
CENTURY SOCIAL INNOVATION, INFINITE 8 INSTITUTE L3C 3–5 (2015), https://issuu.com/
infinite8institute/docs/themicrosibwhitepaper_final_ [https://perma.cc/WJX3-JKAY].
227. See Edmiston & Nicholls, supra note 145, at 65 (explaining that for some SIB
service providers, “the degree of micro-management built into the SIB was actually
reducing their flexibility to autonomously pursue their social mission . . . stakeholders felt
that the resources and time that went into these additional forms of performance
management and measurement could be better spent on front-line services”).
228. See id. at 66 (“Whilst intensive, real-time performance measurement and
management introduced a heightened degree of responsiveness, discipline and rigor to
contracts, it also detracted resources from front-line service provision and reduced the
autonomy of some front-line practitioners.”).
229. See id. at 65; see also supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text.
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motivations, as well as lead to more creative economic
development strategies that may better advance community
economic empowerment and foster democratic engagement in
CED.
C. Prioritizing Evidence-Based Preventative Programs
Alongside expanding the funding pool for social welfare
programs and transferring investment risk to the private sector,
the SIB model provokes a shift in the culture of traditional,
performance-based government contracts by encouraging
government
stakeholders
to
prioritize
evidence-based,
preventative social welfare programs.230 Typically, in
performance-based
government
contracts,
government
constituents negotiate directly with social service providers to
accomplish predefined goals or objectives. The government
constituent identifies a social problem and seeks to minimize the
financial risk to taxpayers by marketing an achievable social
service contract to private contractors.231 Under such contracts,
government payments are typically based upon performance
outputs—i.e., the number of individuals reached through the social
welfare program.232 These contracts are often remedial in nature,
targeting social problems as they arise, or after they have
materialized, all of which further mitigates political and financial
risk.233 In these traditional performance-based government
contracts, the government assumes a substantial percentage of the
financial risks, often leading to a preference for short-term
projects lasting from one to two years.234
In contrast, evidence-based SIB programs are premised on the
achievement of performance outcomes, not performance outputs. A
SIB program typically determines success based upon the
achievement of measurable changes in the behavior of the
individuals within the target population. Although such
behavioral changes are difficult to predict, when this approach is
230. See JOHN K. ROMAN ET AL., FIVE STEPS TO PAY FOR SUCCESS: IMPLEMENTING PAY
SUCCESS PROJECTS IN THE JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 14 (June 2014),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413148-Five-Steps-toPay-for-Success-Implementing-Pay-for-Success-Projects-in-the-Juvenile-and-CriminalJustice-Systems.pdf [https://perma.cc/39D4-NR58]; see also Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra
note 21, at 2 (“Insufficient attention to performance and to measuring and being held
accountable for results can lead to poor outcomes even with abundant funding. These
failures are often inextricably linked to political and institutional constraints.”).
231. See Burand, supra note 26, at 464–65.
232. See Leventhal, supra note 30, at 528.
233. See Callanan et al., supra note 64, at 12; see also Burand, supra note 26, at 463.
234. See Burand, supra note 26, at 465.
FOR
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successful, it can yield beneficial long-term impacts for the target
community. For example, in the case of social welfare programs
targeting prisoner recidivism, traditional performance-based
government contracts would determine success based upon the
number of individuals receiving job training or educational
counseling. The SIB model pushes stakeholders to develop more
robust assessment metrics linked to concrete evidence of
behavioral change.235 In the case of prisoner recidivism, such
evidence has been defined as a reduction in the rate of reconviction
events among the target population. By prioritizing evidencebased programs, state and local governments learn to better
quantify the costs of addressing social inequities, and social
service providers learn to better measure the benefits of their
social service interventions, all of which may drive enhanced
performance management for human service delivery.236 Early
intervention and prevention strategies have already proven to
yield benefits for children and adults in various sectors.237 Further,
the SIB model attracts longer-term financing from impact
investors, which can extend the period of time over which pay-forsuccess contracts are conducted by facilitating funding maturities
with longer performance horizons, all of which supports better
programming.238
235. With improved data collection processes, governments and social service
providers can develop a better understanding of how their target constituents interact with
their social programs. See Leventhal, supra note 30, at 526. This, in turn, can lead to
services that are better fitted to the needs of marginalized communities. See Justin Milner
& Matthew Eldridge, From Evidence to Outcomes: Using Evidence to Inform Pay for Success
Project Design, URB. INST. 8 (May 3, 2016), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/
evidence-outcomes-using-evidence-inform-pay-success-project-design [https://perma.cc/
NSP7-C6A8] (asserting that “[u]sing evidence to make public welfare decisions improves
government effectiveness and drives better outcomes for society”).
236. See Gustafsson-Wright et al., supra note 21, at 43; see also David Stoesz,
Evidence-Based Policy: Reorganizing Social Services Through Accountable Care
Organizations and Social Impact Bonds, 24 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 181, 181 (2014) (“As
evidence-based policy replaces unconditional entitlements, lawmakers will prefer program
activities that are substantiated through field experiments, especially randomized
controlled trials, which show lower cost while producing superior outcomes, over
predecessors. . . . [S]ocial service employment opportunities will shift toward more effective
programs and away from programs that have not demonstrated comparable efficacy.”).
237. For example, Goldman Sachs recently became the first “successful” social impact
investor in the United States with their investment in a SIB program in Utah focused on
early childhood education. Principals at Goldman Sachs explained, “[w]e believe this model
holds promise because it is scalable, replicable and sustainable. It provides a new
framework for thinking about how the public and private sectors can work together to
address pressing social needs in a way that results in better outcomes for children,
alleviates some of the financial burden on taxpayers and generates savings for
governments.” Berlin, supra note 77, at 19.
238. See Burand, supra note 26, at 465 (noting that “whereas traditional government
contracts typically articulate the amount of funds to be expended, the type of services to be
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By incorporating a broader network of stakeholders in deal
making, SIBs enable governments to share the risks of funding
economic development, which may encourage the creation of
innovative social welfare programs that are both preventative and
forward-looking in nature.239 The SIB model gives the private
sector a substantive role in deciding which social services are
delivered to the public and a voice in influencing the methods used
to achieve negotiated performance outcomes.240 However,
notwithstanding assertions that diversity at the decision-making
table can help promote social justice, there is risk in placing
decision-making authority that is traditionally reserved for the
government—such as determining the amount of funds to be
expended, selecting social service providers, defining the types of
services to be delivered, and replacing underperforming
stakeholders—into the hands of private sector stakeholders.241
When private sector stakeholders can disrupt the continuity of
critical social welfare services solely based upon a financial risk
assessment, community constituents who are the beneficiaries of
such social welfare programs stand to suffer.242 This risk is further
amplified by the fact that many SIBs premise their performance
metrics on the validation of administrative data and not on more
complex evaluation methods that may better assess program
performance in light of the social dynamics and historical
frameworks impacting target populations.243 Indeed, SIBs often
oversimplify the complexity and intersectionality of historic social
challenges in an effort to identify quantifiable performance
metrics.244
delivered, and the delivery methods to be used, SIBs can be structured so as to give private
sector players more latitude to decide which services are to be delivered and which methods
are to be used to achieve targeted levels of performance outcomes”).
239. But see infra text accompanying Section V.A (explaining that institutional
investors seeking to minimize financial risk may shy away from funding unproven,
innovative social welfare programs, thereby hindering innovation).
240. For example, in the Peterborough SIB, the SIB intermediary, Social Finance UK,
was delegated authority over selecting program service providers, a role typically conducted
by the government stakeholders until that time. See Burand, supra note 26, at 465 (noting
that “government procurement processes typically give government officials the ultimate
decision-making authority regarding which social service providers to fund and whether to
replace underperforming social service providers”).
241. See id., at 466.
242. See Sinclair et al., supra note 119, at 126 (“This can lead to ‘mission-drift’ (or shift)
as investors pressure service providers to prioritize outcomes that are more readily
measured and away from the most needy.”).
243. See Edmiston & Nicholls, supra note 145, at 69.
244. Jones, supra note 20, at 362 (revealing that “the complexity of social problems
requires comprehensive and multiple interventions and not short-term results; ‘quick fix’
approaches to social problems may hinder public discourse about the complexities and
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There may be further hurdles in delegating traditional
governmental functions to non-governmental stakeholders,
ranging from statutory roadblocks to cultural challenges.
Administrative laws governing public-private partnerships at the
state level may limit the authorities and rights that can be
contractually delegated to private parties.245 Additionally,
government stakeholders, who retain authority to modify or cancel
the terms of SIB contracts, may threaten the success of SIB
programs when politics clashes with policy. If a government
stakeholder modifies or cancels a SIB program during a change in
political leadership, or when the benefits of long-term contracts
are revealed to heighten short-term political risk, private
stakeholders may find their hands tied even if they are guided by
a moral conviction to advance economic justice at great financial
costs. There is need for knowledge sharing and the development of
best practices for SIB governance models that can overcome these
dangers. Further, SIB advocates need to identify how best to
integrate a diverse network of stakeholders while maintaining the
integrity of every SIB’s civic mission.246
V.

THE CHALLENGES FACING SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS

Notwithstanding the opportunities offered by the SIB model,
each opportunity also poses challenges for stakeholders. First, the
complexity of negotiating SIB deals presents a hurdle to their
widespread adoption. They are expensive, require extensive due
diligence, and can impose a high level of financial risk on private
investors. Secondly, SIBs often face significant execution risks.
Under-resourced governments may lack the resources to
implement SIB deals, and social service providers may fail to live
up to their performance goals or collaborate effectively with other
stakeholders. Lastly, a high level of political risk faced by
government stakeholders has challenged the widespread adoption
of the SIB model as a viable social impact tool. Government
stakeholders must not only be adequately resourced to navigate
the complex SIB development process but must also contend with
realities of social problems. . . . Other approaches, such as reducing misdemeanor arrests,
disrupting the school-to-prison pipeline, changes to the bail system, and raising the age of
criminal responsibility would have significant impact on the numbers who cycle though
Rikers.” (citation omitted)).
245. See Burand, supra note 26, at 466.
246. See Burand, supra note 26, at 467 (“The likelihood of refinements reinforces the
need for those participating in early SIB arrangements to engage in what at least one
commentator has termed ‘high value learning,’ so that the lessons of both successful and
unsuccessful SIB structures can be shared broadly and quickly.” (quoting LIEBMAN, supra
note 44, at 20)).
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the politics of administration changes and the impact of diverse
political opinions about social welfare programs in the face of longterm contractual obligations. The following sections discuss these
challenges in turn.
A. Minimizing Transaction Complexity
SIBs are often touted as bringing enhanced “market
discipline” to government contracts for social welfare programs,
leading to more robust due diligence, enhanced accountability, and
improved managerial expertise.247 However, in practice, SIB deals
face a range of complexities that can make them an impractical
tool for many communities. First, private investors may lack the
subject matter expertise to adequately assess program design and
evaluation, while government entities may lack the expertise
necessary to connect program success metrics with short-term or
long-term budgetary savings. Second, SIB advocates may
undermine the importance of the intermediary, who plays a
critical role in connecting SIB stakeholders to community
constituents and also helps stakeholders understand the needs of
the target community. An ill-equipped intermediary can cripple
the implementation of a SIB deal before it has a chance to reap
social rewards for impact investors. Lastly, impact investors will
face continued financial risks as they strive to promote innovative
programs while also seeking to earn a financial return on their
investments. This Article argues that a shift in motivation is
necessary for impact investors to resolve these contradictory goals.
Because SIBs integrate evidence-based outcome metrics into
their program design, SIB deals require a high level of due
diligence beyond that of the traditional public-private
partnership.248 Not only is due diligence for each new SIB program
247. Berlin, supra note 77, at 13; see Burand, supra note 26, at 461; see Jennifer Miller
Oertel et al., Proving That They Are Doing Good: What Attorneys and Other Advisors Need
to Know About Program Assessment, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 693, 696 (2013) (noting that “donors
are looking for objective means to assure that the funds they have given have achieved the
intended outcomes”). But see supra Section II.B (noting that the introduction of additional
systems of performance management may hinder innovations in service provision).
248. Under a typical partnership between traditional community economic
development lenders, due diligence is focused on assessing the ability of the loan recipient
to execute the deal or project, while also identifying any risks that would preclude future
repayment of lenders and investors. Conversely, in a SIB deal, stakeholders must conduct
due diligence within a broader matrix of issues, including: the design of the social service
program and its ability to effectively address the identified social problem within the
targeted population; the framework for measuring the success of the social service program
and its connection to the program’s selected evidence-based outcome metrics; and the
connection between the program’s success metrics and the host government agency’s costaccounting system, which is critical to calculating the success payment for investors that,
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expensive, it is also time-consuming, which could threaten the
prospect of future cost savings altogether.249 Impact investors and
philanthropists are currently exploring innovative program
models that, once widely adopted and standardized, may reduce
due diligence and transaction costs. However, as investors seek to
lower the risk profile and transactions costs of SIB deals by
standardizing and replicating proven social welfare programs,
community-based organizations and community coalitions may
become further silenced in community development conversations.
Institutional investors and national nonprofits that deliver social
welfare programs built upon “best practices” may not reflect the
true needs of residents living in low-income, marginalized
communities. Their assumptions and biases, based upon national
statistics and generalized survey data, may impede the efforts of
grassroots, community-based organizations that understand how
to leverage existing community assets and community
relationships that are constantly in flux.250 Seeking to minimize
transaction costs may undermine efforts to engage smaller, less
resourced community stakeholders, which can hinder long-term
economic justice.
The selection of the SIB intermediary plays an important role
in the due diligence process.251 Government stakeholders often
lack reliable budgeting and costs data systems, making it difficult
to craft reliable estimates of cost savings for SIB programs. A
competent and reliable SIB intermediary can help government
stakeholders navigate the SIB research and development process.
Nevertheless, even with an experienced and reliable intermediary,
a preference for innovative social welfare programs that are
in part, justifies their investment. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 19.
249. See Edmiston & Nicholls, supra note 145, at 70 (“A number of cross-sectoral
stakeholders interviewed for this study felt that the high transaction costs associated with
developing the SIB threatened the future cost savings achievable.”); STELLINA
GALITOPOULOU & ANTONELLA NOYA, OCED, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 3
(2016), http://www.oecd.org/cfe/leed/UnderstandingSIBsLux-WorkingPaper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8Y3-K6MY] (“They have entailed significant transaction costs that
stakeholders should consider before embarking on them.”).
250. Indeed, the success of the Utah SIB was based, in part, on the assumption that
all of the at-risk children in the program, for whom English was a second language, would
have been placed in special education without the intervention. See Berlin, supra note 77,
at 19–20.
251. For example, in the Rikers Island SIB, MDRC conducted significant due diligence
to learn about Rikers Island Prison’s daily operations and assessed whether cognitive
behavioral therapy could both fit into the culture and routine of the facility and be
integrated into the life of returning citizens in their home communities. Additionally,
MDRC identified potential savings to the New York City Department of Corrections and
created payment terms for the SIB investors, all of which required an analysis of the city’s
complex budgeting formula. See id. at 11–13.
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untested or unproven will expose SIB investors to financial risk,252
ultimately leading to increased transactional complexity.
Investors in SIB deals have limited means to manage the risks of
their investment during the lifecycle of the SIB because repayment
is triggered by an independent third-party’s evaluation of the
program’s net “social” impact. If impact investors maintain a
primary focus on minimizing the risk of financial loss by
embedding safety measures into deals, and not on maximizing
social impact, SIB deals will inevitably retain a high level of
complexity or simply choose to avoid innovative, yet risky projects
altogether.253
Alongside loan guarantees from the philanthropic
community,254 some SIB contracts also contain provisions that
release parties from their contractual obligations if another party
is unable to fulfill their agreed-upon responsibilities. Some SIBs
have even incorporated early termination provisions for impact
investors, which can have harmful impacts on government
stakeholders who are left to service the community constituents
left behind.255 While these provisions offer protections for
investors, they also introduce challenges for the sustainability of
SIB programs as they evolve over time. This Article urges both
impact investors and SIB advocates to explore alternative
252. SIBs that prioritize innovative and unproven social welfare programs—far
similar to an equity investment for a venture investor than a typical loan or bond
repayment for a CED lender—bring even greater financial risks. See id. at 9.
253. For example, some private investors have required loan guarantees from the
philanthropic community to mitigate their financial risk. In the Rikers Island SIB in New
York City, Goldman Sachs relied upon a guarantee from Bloomberg Philanthropies to
provide security for potential financial losses. Bloomberg Philanthropies also provided
funding for the deal in a variety of other ways, including grant money to pay for a pilot
phase of the program and funding for the operating expenses of the intermediary
organization. See Eduardo Porto, Wall St. Money Meets Social Policy at Rikers Island, N.Y.
TIMES (July 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/business/economy/wall-st-moneymeets-social-policy-at-rikers-island.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4CYR-J727].
254. As the SIB ecosystem evolves and becomes an increasingly attractive impact
investment for financial institutions, philanthropists will likely continue to play an
important risk mitigation role because of the challenge in establishing risk profiles for SIB
investments and quantifying expected rates of return for innovative and “unproven” SIB
programs. This is not unlike the role played by philanthropists during the evolution of
financing for low-income housing. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 18. Some scholars suggest
that philanthropists should play a more principal role in SIB structures. SIBs provide
philanthropists with the commitment of governments to help support and scale their
successful programs. Moreover, the philanthropic community has a variety of tools,
including grants and program-related investments, which positions it to more readily
provide risk capital for innovative and “unproven” models for social reform. See id. at 21.
255. The Rikers Island SIB included such a provision, enabling investors to terminate
the deal after three years if performance targets were not being reached. See GustafssonWright et al., supra note 21, at 19.
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economic systems that can shift economic development programs
away from the market moralities of capitalism and toward more
community-oriented frameworks, such as the community-focused
“social and solidarity” economy.256 Unfortunately, unless they are
driven by a primarily moral and philanthropic motivation to
advance economic justice, rather than a profit-seeking motivation
to minimize financial losses, impact investors will likely continue
to complicate SIB deals with financial risk mitigations schemes.
Currently, SIB stakeholders have sought to overcome
financial risks by introducing flexibility into the management of
SIB deals.257 SIBs are often built upon inflexible loan agreements
with predetermined performance metrics and program
benchmarks, fixed time periods for program implementation, and
fixed costs that influence the calculation of expected returns for
investors. The rigidity of SIB contractual terms can become a
stumbling block for program adaptability and real-time
innovation. However, social welfare programs operating in lowincome, marginalized communities with unpredictable challenges
require operational flexibility.258 As a result, it is important for
SIBs to include mechanisms that enable stakeholders to respond
quickly to unexpected operational challenges given the complexity
and intersectionality of the myriad social factors that challenge
community development efforts. In other words, transaction
complexity may be a necessary evil of many SIB deals moving
forward.
B. Navigating Execution Risk
SIBs face a high level of execution risks due to the complexity
of each SIB deal, which is designed to address the unique
challenges of the target community. Governments with limited
experience in using pay-for-success contracting for social welfare
256. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
257. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 16.
258. Similar to the Rikers Island SIB in New York City, other SIBs in the United
States targeting recidivism have encountered challenges with meeting their recruitment
goals during the early stages of their programs. For example, both the Center for
Employment Opportunities (CEO) SIB project in New York State and the Roca PFS SIB
Project in Massachusetts met similar challenges. A decrease in the size of the target
population that can be reached by the service provider not only impacts projected
government cost savings but also decreases the population sample size required for effective
program evaluation. The New York State CEO SIB project sought to overcome this program
design risk by building in additional time in the program schedule to accommodate
shortfalls in program recruitment. However, this also lengthened the term of the program,
exposing the deal to greater political risk and imposing greater financial risk on the
investors. See id. at 15–16; see generally Jones, supra note 20, at 362–69.
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services may face difficulty linking the selected social issues with
governmental budgetary expenditures. Further, not all
governments are equipped to effectively collaborate with private
sector stakeholders, determine measurable performance targets,
estimate the costs of funding social service initiatives, or calculate
appropriate performance success fees that can provide a return to
impact investors while ensuring cost savings for the public.259
Some government stakeholders may even resist the delegation of
public decision-making authority to private stakeholders due to
ethical considerations.260
Under-resourced governments face the risk of inappropriately
pricing the financial costs and returns that will be generated from
SIB deals. Some of the benefits, or hidden costs, of SIB deals may
only be realized in the medium- to long-term, and critical insights
may only be learned in hindsight.261 As a result, as in other types
of public-private partnerships,262 governments may face pressure
from private investors to renegotiate the terms of SIB deals over
time or even to shut down SIB programs that are failing to meet
performance goals, which can have a harmful impact on SIB
beneficiaries.263 This risk is even more likely when a market-based
perspective drives the funding decisions of impact investors.
Without an informed understanding of the long-term implications
of certain governmental expenditures, government stakeholders
may be forced to rely upon outside experts, which adds additional
transactional costs to SIB deals.
Ensuring the sustainability of social welfare programs and
the continuity of services is also a critical component of measuring
success. While it might be feasible for private investors to simply
terminate a failing project that does not meet performance

259. See Burand, supra note 26, at 474.
260. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
261. See Burand, supra note 26, at 474 (explaining that this design element leaves
sponsoring host governments “vulnerable to the criticism that the SIB returns payable to
investors are too rich for the risks that are being taken”).
262. See, e.g., Eduardo Engel et al., Soft Budgets and Renegotiations in Public-Private
Partnerships, 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15300, 2009),
http://www.econ.uchile.cl/uploads/publicacion/34605e1898c5635608b0e744498f19d5829ca
a48.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NMG-2WY7] (“One of the problems with PPPs is that
renegotiations of contracts are pervasive. Guasch (2004) examined nearly 1,000 Latin
American concession contracts awarded between the mid 1980s and 2000, and found that
30% of all contracts were renegotiated. The pro- portion reaches 54.4% in the transportation
sector (roads, ports, tunnels and airports) and 74.4% in the water sector.”).
263. See Burand, supra note 26, at 475 (noting that “[o]ne way to mitigate this risk is
to build success-fee formulas for SIBs that correlate directly with the savings generated by
the performance outcomes being funded”).
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benchmarks,264 government stakeholders cannot as easily turn a
blind eye to communities that need the important social services
that are being provided by SIBs. In fact, government stakeholders
may suffer long-term costs by not continuing to fund and operate
even moderately successful social welfare programs that are
launched by SIBs, even when they fail to meet performance
benchmarks.265 Governments that embrace the SIB model will
need to identify contingency strategies to account for missed
performance targets, budgeting missteps, and underperforming
stakeholders that threaten the success of SIB deals.266 Scholars
have noted that this private sector induced “shut down” risk may
be compelling reason enough not to use SIBs to finance and scale
core governmental public services.267
One of the most significant contributors to execution risk is
the role of social service providers and the SIB intermediary.
Although a SIB deal and its accompanying social welfare program
may be designed in accordance with best practices, the selected
social service providers may nevertheless fail to live up to
performance goals or collaborate effectively with other
stakeholders.268 Additionally, the SIB intermediary may not
adequately coordinate and manage the ecosystem of SIB
stakeholders.269 To address this concern, scholars have argued for
a focus on social service providers and SIB intermediaries with a
proven track record of success and the capacity to grow programs
to scale without sacrificing the quality of service delivery.270
However, preexisting biases and/or assumptions may favor wellknown, institutional organizations at the expense of smaller, or
emerging community-based groups.271 An economic development
264. See Edmiston & Nicholls, supra note 145, at 70 (“By virtue of the outcome-based
contracts underpinning the SIB model, services focus on achieving social outcomes, rather
than the continuity of service outputs characteristic of conventional public-sector
commissioning.”).
265. See Berlin, supra note 77, at 22; see also Edmiston & Nicholls, supra note 145, at
71 (noting that “the fragility with which certain social outcomes are secured and
maintained points to the importance of service continuity and support infrastructure
existing alongside SIBs offering more intensive, if only temporary, assistance to target
populations”).
266. See Burand, supra note 26, at 470.
267. See LIEBMAN, supra note 44, at 4 (“The duty to avoid harming treatment
populations may limit social impact bonds to programs that don’t provide ‘core’ services.”).
268. See supra Section II.C.
269. See A NEW TOOL, supra note 176, at 21.
270. See Burand, supra note 26, at 469 (defining capacity as “leadership talent, staff,
governance, management information systems, quality controls, back-office systems, etc.”).
271. SIBs run the risk of excluding smaller organizations from funding and delivering
services. See Sinclair er al., supra note 119, at 126. For example, under the Peterborough
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initiative that undermines or ignores existing community-based
assets may prove to be ineffective in the long-term mission of
addressing the root causes of structural inequality.272 There are
mixed opinions within the nonprofit community about the value of
SIBs, perhaps tied to these very concerns.273 Encouragingly, SIB
advocates have already begun to develop important program
assessment tools to aid the implementation of SIBs.274
Nevertheless, as new SIB programs are created and SIB advocates
target potential service providers with the capacity and resources
to operate social welfare programs, they must also consider how
their programs are helping to develop an “ecosystem of support”
for community-based social service providers as well.275
SIB, it was “estimated that a SIB contract would need to be worth at least 12 million to
cover such overheads as legal fees, evaluation expenses and investor’s due diligence costs.”
Id.; see also Edmiston et al., supra note 145, at 60 (noting that “the majority of SIB contracts
have been awarded to larger third sector organizations, which suggests a lack of sufficient
risk redistribution to allow smaller third sector organizations to participate”).
272. See McFarlane, supra note 33, at 304 (“The discourse fails, however, to take into
account the structure and relational constraints placed on certain geographic places, like
low-income, inner-city communities, that are currently marginalized and increasingly
disconnected from the mainstream of American society.”); see also Morley, supra note 127
at 21 (“For example, job creation SIBs may address certain problems related to structural
unemployment, but may fail to address the fundamental problems of economic growth, class
issues, poverty and poor educational attainment among lower socioeconomic groups that
are the root cause of youth unemployment.”).
273. See Pay for Success, Social Impact Bonds: Principles on New Funding
Mechanisms, NAT’L COUNCIL NONPROFITS (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.councilofnonprofit
s.org/trends-policy-issues/pay-success-social-impact-bonds-principles-new-fundingmechanisms [https://perma.cc/3UJR-VCR2] (noting that SIBs are “neither the cure-all
remedy for every social problem or public funding short-fall as promoted by some nor the
guaranteed disaster in every circumstance warned by others. Rather, they are nuanced
tools that can be appropriate in certain situations”).
274. See Lantz & Iovan, supra note 116 (discussing the Project Assessment Tool
developed by the Urban Institute Pay for Success Initiative, which was designed to
“promote ‘good practices’ in defining social problems, selecting strong interventions,
designing and implementing PFS projects, and conducting rigorous evaluations”); see also
id. (discussing key principles to guide entities considering pay-for-success projects or other
social finance models).
275. See Burand, supra note 26, at 469. It is worth noting that educational institutions
have played an influential role in the development of the SIB “ecosystem of support.” For
example, the Government Performance Lab at Harvard University Kennedy School (GPL),
a product of its Social Impact Bond Technical Assistance Lab (SIB Lab), provides technical
assistance to governments interested in pay-for-success initiatives. See Government
Performance Lab, HARV. KENNEDY SCH., https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/ [https://perma.cc
/N5L2-BK6A] (last visited Sept. 8, 2018). The Sorensen Impact Center, housed in the Policy
Lab at the David Eccles School of Business at the University of Utah, has promoted
"private, public, and social sectors together in uncommon partnerships [to] harness the
power of the capital markets to address critical social and environmental
challenges." See The Sorenson Impact Center and Social Finance Re-Open Pay for Success
Competition, SORENSON IMPACT, DAVID ECCLES SCH. OF BUS., UNIV. OF UTAH (July 12,
2018), https://sorensonimpact.com/pay-for-success-structuring-grant-pressrelease/?rq=social%20impact%20bond. In 2017, a Pay for Success and Social Impact
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C. Overcoming Political Risk
The success of SIBs, and the continued commitment of impact
investors to supporting social innovation, depends in part upon the
ability of government stakeholders to remain invested in SIB
deals. As a central figure in each SIB arrangement, government
stakeholders can hinder SIB participants from meeting their
respective obligations in a variety of ways. Government
constituents agree to use predetermined cost savings that are
generated during the lifecycle of the SIB to repay private investors
upon the achievement of predefined outcome performance metrics.
However, not all projected cost savings materialize in the shortterm, especially as laws and policies change over time. Further,
not all private investors are willing to wait more than three to four
years to earn a return on their investment.276
The sophistication of the government stakeholder poses risks
for the success of every SIB deal. Not all government stakeholders
have the necessary resources or capacity required to navigate the
transactional complexities and challenges of SIBs.277 Moreover,
with the cycle of government administrations typically lasting
only a few years, SIBs face the risk that future government
administration will not honor the terms of existing SIB contracts
due to changes in government leadership or shifts in
political/economic conditions. These are critical areas of concern,
particularly considering the increasing role that government
stakeholders are playing in the regulation and monitoring of the
SIB marketplace.278
Finance conference was held at the University of Virginia, Darden School of Business,
Institute for Business in Society. See Tori S. Yang, Professor Mary Margaret Frank Leads
Discussions at 2017 Pay for Success and Social Impact Finance Conference, INST. FOR BUS.
SOC’Y DARDEN (Feb. 24, 2017), https://blogs.darden.virginia.edu/ibis/2017/02/24
[https://perma.cc/HKW8-7N3D]. In May 2017, New York University Law School launched
the Grunin Center for Law and Social Entrepreneurship, poised to be a leader on issues of
law and social entrepreneurship. See Grunin Center for Law and Social Entrepreneurship,
N.Y.U., http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/grunin-social-entrepreneurship [https://perma.cc/
PB5T-CXG7] (last visited Aug. 12, 2018).
276. See Burand, supra note 26, at 456–57 n.21 (“Social Finance representatives have
noted that they think that three to four years may be the maximum length that SIB
investors would be willing to wait for outcome payments, particularly given the illiquidity
of SIB investments.”); see also FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 169, at 38–
41.
277. See Burand, supra note 26, at 473–74 (“Among the minimum abilities that host
governments will need in order to conduct a SIB negotiation are the abilities to determine
performance targets, to estimate the likely costs of funding interventions to reach those
targets, and to calculate the performance success fees (over those estimated costs) that are
likely to attract sufficient investors to fund the SIB while still preserving savings for the
host government.”).
278. See supra Section II.B (discussing political history of SIB marketplace in the U.S).
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The private interests of specific government actors can also
pose counterparty risks that threaten the success of SIB deals.279
SIBs require a high level of coordination among the various
stakeholders in a typical deal, both during the design and the
implementation of SIB programs. Weak governance, or poor
executive leadership, can impair the long-term viability of SIB
deals.280 The lifecycle of SIBs generally needs to extend beyond the
term of one government administration to reach their full
maturation. As a result, there must not only be wide government
support for a SIB program to be sustainable but also the support
of public institutions and community stakeholders to hold future
government administrations accountable. Unfortunately, it is
often uncertain whether a future government administration will
honor the payment commitments of a current political
administration,281 especially when changes in leadership bring
changes in political ideology that conflict with the philosophical
goals underlying the previous administration’s social welfare
initiatives.282 Several states in the U.S. have taken legislative
steps to advance the development of SIB transactions and counter

279. When governments transition from one political party to the next, some political
figures may seek to avoid the reputational risk of supporting innovative SIB programs that
fail to achieve their social service goals. See Burand, supra note 26, at 480 (discussing how
reputational risk can have far-reaching implications for the SIB, including how a highly
publicized SIB controversy could trigger the contagion risk of a wider collapse in the SIB
marketplace); see also Lantz & Iovan, supra note 116 (“For example, an evidence-based teen
pregnancy intervention that would increase women’s access to long-acting reversible
contraceptives may meet with moral or religious objections from elected officials, public
agency leadership, or community-based groups. As another example, some people object to
supportive housing interventions that combine subsidized/free housing with social services
to people with active substance abuse problems, because they believe taxpayers should not
be providing housing support to people who use illegal drugs.”).
280. See Callanan et al., supra note 64, at 35 (discussing the value of executive
leadership in catalyzing the development of SIB programs).
281. Governments generally cannot create budget obligations that extend into future
legislatures and impose restrictions on future government spending. SIBs require
appropriate legal conditions to ensure that governments can make payments under the
contract beyond the fiscal year in which a contract is made. It may be necessary for legal
conditions to be created to facilitate directing funds to an intermediary organization; to
enable the intermediary to make certain decisions on behalf of government constituents,
such as selecting service providers; and to define how the host government will treat hybrid
investments that include both debt and equity components. See Gustafsson-Wright et al.,
supra note 21, at 6.
282. Multi-year SIBs that commit host governments to repay private investors based
upon the future success of the program may need special authorization and appropriate
legislation to bind the host government to long-term, pay-for-success contractual
obligations. See Burand, supra note 26, at 476; see also Cox, supra note 30, at 979 (“Typical
appropriations statutes are often unable to commit the government to either multi-year or
contingent contracts . . . .”).
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the threat posed by these counterparty risks.283 More work still
remains.
Governments also face the risk of SIB stakeholders taking
unethical actions to meet performance targets or overstating the
impact of their service programs to attract future funding support,
all of which comes at the expense of SIB beneficiaries and host
communities.284 This issue has already arisen in the microfinance
sector, where the presence of increased private sector capital in
recent years has led some microfinance institutions to rapidly
scale their services without providing adequate customer
protection safeguards.285 Where a dishonest or overly ambitious
SIB social service provider uses inappropriate means to ensure
programmatic success, government stakeholders will be pressured
to step in and fill the void, which will increase transaction costs
and potentially erode government cost savings. Government
stakeholders will need to negotiate these “step in” rights during
the development of SIB deals to authorize their ability to act on
behalf of other stakeholders; and to ensure that the beneficiaries
of the SIB deal, especially the residents of the communities where
SIB programs are located, are not negatively impacted by
unanticipated program failures.286
283. For example, in 2012 in Massachusetts, the government passed legislation
establishing a trust fund to authorize up to $50 million for pay-for-success contracts and to
provide that governmental payment obligations would constitute “a general obligation of
the commonwealth for which the full faith and credit of the commonwealth shall be pledged
for the benefit of the providers of the contracted government services.” See generally MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 10, § 35VV (2012); see Burand, supra note 26, at 476–78; see also Schneider,
supra note 209, at 575 n.361 (“General legislation has been passed or introduced in
California, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Washington; contract legislation
passed or introduced in Colorado, Florida, Pennsylvania, Texas, and the District of
Columbia.”).
284. See, e.g., Burand, supra note 26, at 470; see also Edmiston & Nicholls, supra note
145, at 59 (“In certain instances, the marketisation of social outcomes has been found to
compromise service quality and integrity due to ‘gaming’ and perverse incentives.”); see also
supra Section II.D (discussing ethical concerns of SIBs).
285. For example, according to Burand, supra note 26, at 470:
[A] social service provider participating in a SIB aimed at reducing the number of
children residing in foster care might start returning children to dangerous family
situations without sufficient regard for the children’s safety. Or a social service
provider participating in a SIB aimed at prisoner recidivism might interfere with
legal processes to ensure that reconviction rates are delayed or inappropriately
frustrated during periods when SIB reconviction targets are to be measured.
See also Edmiston et al., supra note 145, at 59 (“In certain instances, the marketization of
social outcomes has been found to compromise service quality and integrity due to gaming
and perverse incentives.”).
286. To combat the risk of unethical behavior, host governments can require rigorous
due diligence, include provisions in the SIB contract for termination or replacement rights
in the event of unethical or inappropriate actions by stakeholders, and include financial
penalties in the SIB contract in the event of a pattern of unethical or inappropriate behavior
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Navigating the intervention model risk posed by the selected
service program may prove more difficult. While some scholars
suggest that limiting SIB funding to proven social welfare
programs can minimize this risk,287 this may obscure the role of
government and undermine the potential for social finance to scale
innovation.288 Additionally, it may lead SIB advocates to overlook
underfunded innovative social welfare programs, especially in
cases where social welfare programs have outcomes that are
difficult to quantify using performance metrics.289 This seems to
obscure the very purpose of SIBs, which many have argued is to
promote innovation in public service delivery. Further, not all
effective social welfare programs can be scaled without impacting
the quality of services being offered. As the ecosystem of SIB deals
evolve, it may be useful for governments to establish independent
“watchdog” organizations that can help to regulate the behavior of
stakeholders participating in SIB deals and ensure that the needs
of vulnerable populations impacted by SIB programs are
prioritized.290 Additionally, SIB advocates should continue to
create resource banks and toolkits to assist host governments in
developing and managing SIB transactions.291
VI. CONCLUSION
“Philanthropy is commendable, but it must not cause the
philanthropist to overlook the circumstances of economic injustice
which make philanthropy necessary.” – Rev. Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr.
“[T]he term revolutionary, as I am using it does not connote
violence; it refers to the qualitative transformation of fundamental
by stakeholders. See Burand, supra note 26, at 471 n.59.
287. See id. at 468–69; see also Callanan et al., supra note 64, at 19.
288. See Sections II.C–D.
289. Meghan Joy & John Shields, Social Impact Bonds: The Next Phase of Third Sector
Marketization?, 4 CAN. J. NONPROFIT & SOC. ECON. RES., Autumn 2013, at 39, 48; Toby
Lowe & Rob Wilson, Playing the Game of Outcomes-Based Performance Management. Is
Gamesmanship Inevitable? Evidence from Theory and Practice, 51 SOC. POL’Y ADMIN. 981,
992–95 (2017); McHugh, supra note 126, at 249.
290. See Burand, supra note 26, at 471–72; see also McGrath, supra note 20, at 822
(“One of the steps the government can take to greatly improve impact investing is
strengthening the industry infrastructure through changes in regulation, as well as
establishing sufficient leadership to monitor the market.”).
291. See Burand, supra note 26, at 474 n.62; see also McGrath, supra note 20, at 822
(“Encouraging and developing specialists impact investment managers and impact
investment intermediaries would attract investment, provide data and analysis, and
implement the necessary cultural changes in mainstream finance.”).
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institutions, more or less rapidly, to the point where the social and
economic structure which they comprised can no longer be said to
be the same.” – Bayard Rustin292
There is a story about capitalism that often goes untold in the
narrative of the American Dream. When Andrew Carnegie built
his famous steel empire in the rich tradition of American
imperialism,293 he did so on the backs of low-income workers, often
through unethical business practices and shady corporate deals.294
As corporations today receive praise for their corporate
philanthropy and impact investment portfolios, many of which will
increasingly include the SIB model of social welfare delivery,295
they also routinely hunt for ways to lower their tax burdens and
maximize their corporate profits at the expense of employee
benefits, all while hiding the hypocrisy of unethical market
moralities behind the thin veil of charity.296 Indeed, while many
have praised Jeff Bezos for embracing Andrew Carnegie’s
philanthropic tradition by donating millions toward the education
of immigrants, few are lifting the veil and questioning why his
company relies so heavily on independent contractors; why so
many of his employees are on food stamps; why local governments
with struggling educational systems are channeling limited
292. Bayard Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement,
in THE CIVIL RIGHTS READER; BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 337, 340
(Leon Friedman ed., 1968).
293. While a discussion of America’s imperialist tradition of chattel slavery and racial
terrorism, and its connection to the growth of America’s global economy, is beyond the scope
of this Article, see generally IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO
CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA (2000); DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY
ANOTHER NAME: THE REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO
WORLD WAR II (1st ed. 2008).
294. See Ed Burmila, Jeff Bezos, Amazon and Why ‘Charity’ Is the Wrong Solution,
ROLLING STONE (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/amazon-jeff-bezosrichest-man-philanthropy-charity-w515535 [https://perma.cc/8FCV-72VJ] ([“Andrew
Carnegie’s wealth] was built in no small part on the low pay and shabby treatment of his
workforce for decades. And he hired strikebreakers to kill his employees who dared to
unionize (the infamous Homestead Strike of 1892 was at the main Carnegie Steel plant and
resulted in the workforce being replaced with non-union immigrants). He used every legal
subterfuge available, as was common during the Robber Baron era, from price-fixing and
collusion to bribery and brute force to build his business empire.”).
295. Impact investing by U.S. foundations currently comprises approximately “onehalf of 1 percent of grant spending” and “2 percent of endowment spending.” Rangan, supra
note 200, at 35. Accordingly, there is much opportunity for increased funding in social
finance innovations like the SIB. Id.
296. See Burmila, supra note 294 (“Imagine if people like Bezos and companies like
Amazon paid in practice anywhere close to the tax rates that apply to people of such great
wealth in theory. Imagine if a company of such staggering wealth—$43 billion in revenue
in a single quarter of 2017—paid its employees enough to send their own kids to college.”).
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taxpayer dollars to court his company as it seeks a new
headquarters location; why a CEO donating 0.03% of his net
worth, the equivalent of a person worth $1 million donating $300,
is worthy of such widespread acclaim?297 Amazon is just one
example of many.
These facts point toward the need for a new “gospel of wealth,”
a reimagining of philanthropy that begins to explore the root
causes of poverty and the structural determinants of systemic
oppression. To many philanthropists and impact investors, the
emerging social impact bond model seems to be a step in the right
direction toward finally realizing that new vision. And it may very
well be. The SIB, which seemingly finds a middle ground between
place-based and people-based economic development strategies,
represents a promising approach to addressing criminal justice
and other social challenges. Tapping into the altruistic
motivations of socially conscious impact investors, it provides a
platform for the private market to bear the financial risks of
preventative, forward-looking social welfare programs. Further,
the SIB model is increasingly being used by governments around
the world to address a wide array of social challenges, providing
much needed investment capital for innovative social welfare
programs that otherwise would likely go unfunded.
Specifically, as discussed in this Article, the SIB model
provides for the expansion of investment capital for social
innovation, the transfer of investment risk from the public sector
to the private sector, and the prioritization of evidence-based
preventative social welfare programs. Nevertheless, as this Article
has revealed, the SIB model also presents critical challenges to its
stakeholders, including the high level of transaction complexity of
SIB deals, the significant execution risks that arise during the
implementation of complex SIB deals, and the political risks that
threaten the longevity of SIBs. Further, under the influence of a
pervasive dogma of free-market fundamentalism, and a dominant
neoliberal political orthodoxy that shape program design, the SIB
model perpetuates the privatization of public welfare service
delivery. This practice may erode the ability of governments to
uphold the values and ideals of democratic citizenship and
maintain their primary role as both the protectors and providers
of public welfare.
The integration of financial incentives for the private sector
into the delivery of public services—a marketization of public
welfare service delivery—runs the risk of undermining the moral
297.

See id.
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and ethical value of nonprofit and philanthropic organizations who
are dedicated to civic missions.298 Perhaps this is to be expected,
given the hegemonic capitalist system that undergirds America’s
philanthropic efforts.299 Indeed, as Andrew Carnegie argued,
perhaps capitalism and its discontents are “beyond our power to
alter.”300 Nevertheless, as public service becomes increasingly “demoralized,” and economic development becomes increasingly less
about delivering a vision of ethical democratic life grounded in
solidarity, and more about maximizing private self-interests to
advance collective benefit, SIB advocates must be wary of not only
hindering community empowerment but also undermining social
justice.
As a result, notwithstanding its potential for positive social
impact across a wide range of social issues, including the criminal
justice sector, the SIB model will likely struggle to meaningfully
impact systemic social and economic inequality because of its
grounding in a capitalist economic system that often hinders
democratic engagement and undermines economic justice. The
current SIB model fails to meaningfully wrestle with our nation’s
history of institutional racism and racial segregation that has
entrenched entire communities into the ditches of poverty.301
While the current SIB model has perhaps set us on the path
toward a new “gospel of wealth,” more work remains for us to find
salvation from the sins of capitalism.302 Looking forward, scholars
should explore new economic development frameworks to guide
298. See Jones, supra note 20, at 361–62 (“SIBs divert investments away from
philanthropy and increase the burden on the third sector, thereby undermining claims that
the private sector is bearing the SIB risk.”).
299. See CARNEGIE, supra note 4, at 1, 3 (“It is well, nay, essential for the progress of
the race, that the houses of some should be homes for all that is highest and best in
literature and the arts, and for all the refinements of civilization, rather than that none
should be so. . . . The price which society pays for the law of competition, like the price it
pays for cheap comforts and luxuries, is also great; but the advantage of this law are also
greater still, for it is to this law that we owe our wonderful material development, which
brings improved conditions in its train.”).
300. Id. at 1.
301. See McFarlane, supra note 33, at 351 (explaining that economic development
programs often ignore “configurations of poverty segregated by race or ethnicity” and
“threaten[] to harden these boundaries beyond all hope of remedy because the program[s]
ignored current structural and historical policies that have shaped and configured our
racialized landscape”).
302. As Michael Edwards has written, there is a class of social justice advocates who
are looking for ways to “transform economic power structures and ways of living together,
rather than just using markets as instruments to deliver social goods.” Such individuals
“put a lot more emphasis on supporting collective action and the empowerment of those
usually classified as beneficiaries in order to seek systemic change in public health, in
education, and elsewhere.” See MICHAEL EDWARDS, SMALL CHANGE: WHY BUSINESS WON’T
SAVE THE WORLD 28 (2010).
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the implementation of the SIB model. Specifically, a justice-based
approach to economic development—one that prioritizes economic
justice and democratic engagement in the economic development
process—can perhaps lead to more innovative social welfare
programs, while also opening the door for new ideas that will
meaningfully impact the root causes and structural determinants
of poverty.303
This Article has not called for an abandonment of capitalism.
Instead, it suggests that it may be worthwhile to explore new
blended economic models that may better facilitate philanthropy
and address the stubborn issue of poverty in America.
Interestingly, if we dug below the surface of the word
philanthropy, we would discover that it translates, stemming from
the Greek and the Latin, to the phrase loving people.304 Have we
created an economic system where the few are gifted opportunities
to profit from the oppression of the many and then invited to love
themselves, more and more, through praised acts of so-called
“charity” or “social” impact? Or should we instead reconsider who
philanthropy is calling us to love? Dare I say, if we aspire to be a
truly democratic nation who loves her citizens and values the
ideals of justice and individual self-worth, then until community
becomes an integral part of our new gospel of wealth, corporate
philanthropy will simply be a misnomer, and impact investing
another financial scheme of neoliberalism’s economic ploy.

303. A robust discussion of such an economic justice framework, including the ways in
which it may promote democratic values, is beyond the scope of this Article. The Author
intends to explore this line of inquiry in future scholarship.
304. See Philanthropy, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/
philanthropy [https://perma.cc/NTH4-XRAX] (last visited July 2, 2018).
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